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(1730-1740) 
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 The reign of Russian empress Anna Ivanovna (1730-1740) has been known 
primarily for disproportionate “German” influence, Anna’s refusing the “conditions” 
imposed by the supposedly backward-looking noble faction that engineered her 
succession, and unflattering court spectacle.  Religion and foreign policy have received 
relatively little attention.  Meanwhile, the formalization of Anglo-Russian diplomatic and 
trade relations during Anna’s reign has been seen as the triumph of “modern” nobility 
who rose as a result of the Petrine reforms.  Examination of the concomitant diplomatic 
relations has focused on the strategies and personalities of Anna’s “German” advisors and 
portrays Russia as dependent.  Finally, the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39, if mentioned 
at all, is generally seen as a humiliating defeat. 
 
This study reveals the “Lutheran Yoke” as an aspect of the infamous “German 
Yoke,” in the context of ongoing integration of Lutheran Baltic German elites whose 
territories were annexed during Peter I’s reign.  Religion had been a divisive issue within 
and without Russia when Peter’s church reforms were criticized as “Lutheran” by clergy 
with roots in Kiev and sympathetic to Catholic doctrine.  1730s Russia remained a locus 
of interdenominational cross-fertilization and conflict, integrated into confessional 
struggles across Europe.   
 
 Russia did not overcome backwardness to enter into the Anglo-Russian 
Commercial Treaty of 1734. Nor did the British carry off a diplomatic coup by forcing 
Russia to move forward without a reciprocal defensive alliance.  Rather, after the 
resolution of decades of Jacobite/Hanoverian and strategic struggle that strained relations, 
Russia used the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 as leverage to secure the 
British/Dutch mediation that allowed it to remove troops from Poland during the War of 
the Polish Succession. 
 
Though some attribute religious motivations to the Russo-Turkish war of 1736-
39, nearly all historians consider control of the Crimea and Black Sea the objective.  
British correspondence reveals Russia’s additional motivation to maintain the Caucasian 
isthmus as a buffer and trade zone.  The Treaty of Belgrade (1739), disallowing Russia 
from fortifying Azov or sailing its own ships on the Black Sea, appears less humiliating 
when we recognize that Russia continued to benefit from Persian trade without the 
expense of occupation.  
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 1 
Introduction	  
 
Anna Ivanovna’s reign (1730 – 1740), a decade receiving relatively little attention 
in English-language Russian historiography, deserves fresh examination.  The last 
English book-length exploration of Empress Anna’s rule was a biography published in 
1974.1  When Anna ascended in 1730, she became the third sovereign to reign since Peter 
I's death in 1725 and in so doing thwarted the plans of a section of the nobility who 
attempted to place restraints on her monarchical power through the famous “conditions” 
she initially accepted.  Her reign has been known primarily for the events surrounding her 
succession; disproportionate “German” influence; and unflattering, cruel court spectacle.2   
Other aspects of her rule have been highlighted, however.  The court returned to 
St. Petersburg in 1732 after having returned to Moscow during the reign of Peter II, 
resulting in a reinvigoration of the city and a rehabilitation of the navy.  Anna’s court was 
known for its incredible splendor, rivaling those of Western Europe, as well as for the 
development of the ballet, and the Italianizing of court music.3  The Land Forces Cadet 
College, opened in Moscow in 1731, was the first indigenous institution to offer 
performing arts training, providing young men instruction in music and dance.  In 1738 a 
ballet school, which would eventually become the St. Petersburg School of Ballet, 
                                                
1 Mina Curtiss, A Forgotten Empress – Anna Ivanovna and Her Era: 1730 – 1740 (New York: Frederick 
Ungar Publishing Co., 1974). 
2 Alexander Lipski, in "A Re-Examination of the 'Dark Era' of Anna Ionnovna," American Slavonic and 
East European Review 15 no. 4 (1956), rehabilitated Anna’s reign by countering vitriolic, anti-“German” 
nineteenth-century historiography with an emphasis on the westernizing achievements of prominent 
Germanophone servitors.  Curtiss emphasized cultural developments but also positioned Anna’s reign as a 
dark harbinger of the most oppressive aspects of Soviet rule. 
3 Marina Ritzarev, Eighteenth-century Russian Music (Aldershoot: Ashgate, 2006), 39. 
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opened to males and females.4  In 1734, Russia decided officially to make the Orenburg 
fort complex across the Qupchaq steppe its “Window to the East,” initiating a more 
concerted effort to govern the nomadic peoples of the steppe, extend its frontiers into 
Central Asia, and build wealth through Central Asian trade.5   
In the legal sphere, Anna reversed Peter the Great’s Law of Single Inheritance in 
1731, apparently securing noble women’s rights and over time, leading to an expansion 
of the rights of other women.6  In 1736, Anna “reduced the [noble] service requirement to 
25 years and allowed one son to stay home and look after the estate.”7  Laws promulgated 
under Anna forbid peasants from buying “real estate or mills, establish factories, or 
become parties to government leases or contracts.”  After 1731, “landlords acquired 
increasing financial control over their serfs, for whose taxes they were held responsible.”  
Subsequent to 1736, they had to obtain landlord permission before departing for 
temporary employment.8   
This work turns toward less explored and misinterpreted areas of Anna’s reign.  
Religion and foreign policy have received little attention relative to the above-mentioned 
developments.  Additionally, the formalization of Anglo-Russian diplomatic and trade 
relations during Anna’s reign has been erroneously interpreted as the triumph of 
“modern” nobility who rose as a result of the Petrine reforms.  Examination of the 
diplomatic relations surrounding the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 has 
                                                
4 Lurana Donnels O’Malley, “Signs from Empresses and Actresses: Women and Theatre in the Eighteenth 
Century,” in Women in Russian Culture and Society, 1700-1825 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
12. 
5 Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 156. 
6 Barbara Alpern Engel, Women in Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) xv. 
7 Lindsey Hughes, The Romanovs: Ruling Russia 1613-1917 (New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2008), 
97. 
8 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia Fifth Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
250. 
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focused on the strategies and personalities of Anna’s “German” advisors and portrays 
Russia as dependent on the British.  Finally, the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39, if 
mentioned at all, is generally seen as a humiliating defeat.  Examination of these three 
areas allows us to begin to deepen our understanding of post-Petrine religious, 
diplomatic, and foreign policy developments. 
Chapter 1 reveals that under Peter I and Anna Ivanovna, Russia underwent what 
we will call confessionalized westernization.  The “Lutheran Yoke” emerges as an aspect 
of the infamous “German Yoke,” in the context of Russia’s ongoing integration of 
Lutheran Baltic German elites whose territories were annexed during Peter I’s reign 
(1682-1725).  Russia had been undergoing “westernization” through Polish-Lithuanian 
and Ukrainian influences in the latter half of the seventeenth century, especially after the 
annexation of Kiev.  In the early eighteenth century, religion became a divisive issue 
within and without Russia when Peter’s church reforms were criticized as “Lutheran” by 
clergy with roots in Kiev and sympathetic to Catholic doctrine.  Additionally, during 
Peter I’s reign, a mixture of esoteric, Pietist, and additional influences from Jacobite 
notables impacted court culture.  As we shall see, 1730s Russia remained a locus of 
interdenominational cross-fertilization and conflict, integrated into confessional struggles 
across Europe.   
 Chapter 2 focuses on the factors that enabled Russia and Britain to commence 
formal diplomatic and trade relations in 1734.  Historians who have examined diplomatic 
maneuvers surrounding the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 have focused on 
the treaty itself, concluding that Russia had to capitulate without securing a much sought-
after reciprocal defensive alliance.  Moreover, Russia supposedly had to overcome 
 4 
“backward” nobility without any interest in Western trade to want to secure the formal 
alliance.  In actuality, after the resolution of decades of Jacobite/Hanoverian and strategic 
struggle that strained relations, Russia used the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 
1734 as leverage to secure the British/Dutch mediation that allowed it to remove troops 
from Poland during the War of the Polish Succession.  This reveals not only that Russia 
actually did secure the outcome it desired from the negotiations but also that it is 
important to look beyond official treaties to understand the outcomes of states’ 
negotiations. 
There may not be a more important question than why wars are fought.  Though 
some attribute religious motivations to the Russo-Turkish war of 1736-39, nearly all 
historians consider control of the Crimea and Black Sea the objective.  As we see in 
Chapter 3, however, British correspondence reveals Russia’s additional motivation to 
maintain the Caucasian isthmus as a buffer and trade zone.  The Treaty of Belgrade that 
ended the war in 1739, disallowing Russia from fortifying Azov or sailing its own ships 
on the Black Sea, appears less humiliating when we recognize that Russia continued to 
benefit from Persian trade without the expense of continuing to occupy the territories it 
ceded just before hostilities broke out.  
This study relies almost entirely on British diplomatic correspondence, which is, 
of course, inherently problematic.  The British accounts are written primarily from the 
point of view of diplomat Claudius Rondeau and rely on court discussions and gossip, as 
well as conversations with Russian cabinet members or favorites.9  Upon his 
                                                
9 Rondeau was born to French Protestant immigrants to Britain and beginning in 1728 served as a secretary 
to his predecessor at the Russian court, Thomas Ward.  See Katherine Turner, ‘Vigor , Jane (1699–
1783)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008.  
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predecessor’s untimely death, Rondeau promptly married his widow and then faithfully 
served King George II until he perished from what seems to have been a cold in 1739.  
Rondeau’s assessments of affairs are not always accurate.  This information may seem 
less reliable than the official communications or publications of statespersons, however, 
in many respects communications at court could have been just as dissimulative or 
revealing as official communications.  Additionally, the correspondence includes the 
points of view of the king, the Secretary of the Northern Department in Britain, and 
reports from British residents across Europe.  These dispatches, providing multiple points 
of view and valuable insights, have been underutilized.  
 The chief sources are three volumes of the Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago 
obshchestva, or documents published by the Russian Historical Society.  These books, 
printed in the late eighteenth century, contain transcriptions of British correspondence.  
This work is based on the years 1729 – 1739, representing around 1700 pages of 
dispatches.  Additionally, the Hanbury Williams Papers from the Lewis Walpole Library 
in Farmington, CT have been utilized.  Correspondence between Lord Harrington, 
Secretary of Britain’s Northern Department, and George Woodward, envoy to 
Saxony/Poland in Warsaw, provide insight into the religious strife occurring in Poland 
during the War of the Polish Succession.  
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Chapter	  I	  -­‐	  
Interdenominational	  Russia:	  Lutheranism	  and	  Elite	  
Integration	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Petrine	  Age	  
 
Anna Ivanovna’s reign (1730-1740) quickly became notorious for the 
disproportionate number of “Germans” who wielded influence at her court.  While the 
historiography on her rule has shifted between emphases on “weak” and “strong” German 
influence, examined the conflicting motivations of statespersons, or celebrated the 
modernizing innovations of particular “German” notables, it has not considered 
“German” prominence as an aspect of ongoing elite integration.10  Though many of the 
Germanophone advisors at court hailed from areas outside of the empire, including 
Westphalia and Courland, others came from Baltic German territories that had been 
annexed by Russia during the Great Northern War (1700-21).  These primarily Lutheran 
elites received a disproportionate number of official appointments and would continue to 
wield strong influence over governmental affairs through the nineteenth century.   
Just as elite integration has received little attention, the religious aspect of conflict 
among the new elites has not been considered as an aspect of the “German Yoke.”  This 
chapter examines two confessionally related incidents recorded in British diplomatic 
correspondence during Anna Ivanovna’s reign that have not been explored in English-
language literature.11  First, in 1732 the Duke of Illyria, the previous Spanish envoy to the 
Russian court, published an inflammatory text with the help of Russian Orthodox clergy, 
                                                
10 John T. Alexander minimizes the role of Germans in, "The Petrine Era and After: 1689 – 1740," in 
Russia: A History, Third Edition, ed. by Gregory Freeze (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 128.   
11 Mina Curtiss devotes a chapter to “Church and Court” but focuses primarily on ceremony and the trials 
of church reformer Feofan Prokopovich during Peter II’s reign.  He had been instrumental in Peter the 
Great’s church reforms and also justified the execution of Peter II’s father, Alexis.  Curtiss mentions the 
troop deployment issue in the context of a discussion about Biron’s character. See Mina Curtiss, A 
Forgotten Empress - Anna Ivanovna and her Era (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co, 1974), 130-
142 and 82-83. 
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denouncing Anna’s Lutheran-dominated regime and castigating Lutherans and Calvinists.  
Second, in 1734 the Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI (r. 1711-1740) refused to allow 
Ernst Johann Biron (1690 – 1772), Anna’s Great Chamberlain and quasi-husband, to 
build a Lutheran church on land the emperor had given him in the Silesian county of 
Wartenburg within the Holy Roman Empire (HRE).  In response, the Russian court 
withheld the troops Charles desperately needed during the War of the Polish Succession 
(1733-1735).  Placing these events in the context of early-eighteenth-century European 
confessional strife reveals that religion remained a powerfully divisive political and 
rhetorical force across Europe into the 1730s.  Though issues related to religion alone did 
not cause The War of the Polish Succession, the events surrounding the war, and ongoing 
religious strife in Central and Eastern Europe, evoked primarily Lutheran-Catholic 
struggles that occurred throughout the first quarter of the eighteenth century.  Events in 
Russia also evoked religious conflict from that time, when the promotion of St. 
Petersburg as a “new Jerusalem” and debates about Peter I’s church reforms circulated 
throughout Europe.  That Anna Ivanovna’s decade, often associated with the “German 
yoke” of Baltic and Westphalian advisors, was also to some degree portrayed as a 
“Lutheran” yoke reveals continuity with Russian and Ukrainian criticisms of Peter the 
Great’s church reforms from earlier in the century.  Further, the Lutheran Pietism and 
esotericism generally associated with Catherine II’s reign (1762 – 96) had roots in the 
Petrine era (1682 – 1725).  In the 1730s, Russia remained a site of both pan-European 
confessional cross-fertilization and strife as Russia integrated the Baltic Germans, and 
Germanophone advisors negotiated for the Russian court’s interest, and their own 
commitment to the “Protestant Interest.” 
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Recent historiography has shifted away from the notion that Peter the Great’s 
church reforms coincided with a secularization of court culture.12  Robert Collis 
contributes to what has emerged as a major shift in Petrine studies, dislocating the tsar's 
image as a "rational," "Enlightenment"-espousing paradigm-shifter and emphasizing the 
religious and esoteric aspects of Petrine court culture.  Collis illustrates that astrology and 
alchemy interested Peter's courtiers, clergy, and the tsar and shows that "mystical, 
eschatological and esoteric views" became influential before the Masonic and 
Rosicrucian influences penetrated during Catherine II's reign.13  He reveals that Peter was 
continually associated with Biblical figures rhetorically and through visual 
representations, and that in creating St. Petersburg as the "new Jerusalem," he took on a 
Davidic role and drew on European notions of a Christian utopia.14  Collis focuses 
especially on two British Jacobite companions of Peter’s who heavily influenced the 
development of Russia’s mining and printing as well as the institution of the botanical 
garden and kunstkamera, which would become aspects of the Academy of Sciences.  
Additionally, he examines Stefan Iavorskii and Feofan Prokopovich, who influenced 
Peter’s church reforms and crafted religiously-centered rhetoric.  Jesuits with an interest 
in astrology and mysticism influenced Iavorskii.15  This influence might have been 
evident in a pamphlet written by Iavorskii, and published through the Kiev Academy in 
1728, called The Rock of Faith, an anti-Protestant attack on Feofan Prokopovich that also 
provided a "veiled exposition of the Catholic doctrine of the two powers, of the 
                                                
12 See Ernest A. Zitser, The Transfigured Kingdom: Sacred Parody and Charismatic Authority at the Court 
of Peter the Great, Studies of the Harriman Institute Columbia University, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2004).   
13 Robert Collis, The Petrine Instauration: Religion, Esotericism and Science at the Court of Peter the 
Great, 1689-1725 (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2012), 31-32. 
14 Ibid., 385. 
15 Ibid., 214. 
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superiority of the spiritual power of the church over secular authority."16  In contrast to 
these Catholic influences, Collis argues that Prokopovich's worldview was informed by 
Pietism, "an Orthodox faith based on the writings of Eastern church fathers,” and  “an 
esoteric worldview that embraced eclectic elements of Aristotelianism, Christian Neo-
Platonism and Hermeticism.”17  Rather than a rational, scientific motivation, in 
Prokopivich's thought Collis sees an "Early Modern expression of eclecticism that 
incorporated Reformed Protestant chiliasm and Biblical exegesis, the distinct mysticism 
of early Eastern Church Fathers and a continuing belief in occult correspondences and 
powers."18 Clearly, Petrine elite culture, and religious reform and rhetoric, integrated 
wider European cultural/religious threads and conflicts. 
During Peter I’s reign, this pan-European religious conflict manifested in Johann 
Franz Buddeas’ Ecclesia Romana cum ruthenica irreconciliabilis, published in Latin in 
the German town of Jena in 1719.  The tract defended Peter I’s right to reform his 
church.19  During France’s Jansenist controversy, the Sorbonne published a memoir 
justifying the king’s independence from all powers and parties except God and promoting 
the union of the Catholic and Orthodox churches.20  Peter visited the Sorbonne himself in 
1717 during his second trip to Western Europe and received a copy of the memoir.  
According to James Cracraft, Buddeas rigorously countered the union-related aspects of 
the Sorbonne memoir “from a rationalistic and Protestant point of view.”  Further, 
Cracraft notes, “amidst the flattering references to Tsar Peter and the violent diatribes 
                                                
16 Ibid., 41.  Paul Bushkovitch claims that under Iavorskii, “a sort of Baroque semi-Catholic spirituality 
became predominant in the Russian church, lasting until midcentury,” in Religion and Society in Russia 
(New York: Oxford University press, 1992), 239.  As we shall see below, however, Lutheran influence 
supplanted Catholic/Baroque influence before midcentury. 
17 Ibid., 272. 
18 Ibid. 
19 See James Cracraft, The Church Reform of Peter the Great (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd, 1971), 47.  
20 Ibid., 44. 
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against the Roman church, one can detect the central thread of Buddeus’s argument: Peter 
ought not to surrender his supremacy over the church to the pope of Rome.”21  It seems as 
though this tract potentially inflamed Lutherans, Catholics on all sides of the Jansenist 
controversy, and the Orthodox. 
This debate was evoked at the Russian court and in Central Europe in the early 
1730s.  On October 7, 1732, Rondeau reported that many Russian clergy had been “taken 
up of late and sent to the castle of this place, among whom are two archbishops,” but he 
did not know why.22  A week later he wanted to discuss the prospective Anglo-Russian 
commercial treaty with Baron Osterman, but the latter had been tasked with heading a 
commission interrogating two archbishops and the Russian clergy about the 
dissemination of “seditious” letters about Anna and her cabinet, as well as a religious 
tract published in Vienna.23  After one of the letters was discovered in the great hall of the 
court, Anna issued a decree declaring that anyone finding another must burn it without 
reading.24  Additionally, the Duke of Illyria, who had served as Spain’s resident at the 
court, had allowed his chaplain, Father Rivera, to print a book in Vienna called Examen 
Veri written in collaboration with clergy in St. Petersburg to defend the Orthodox Church 
against the Buddeus tract.25  In addition to defending the Orthodox church, the 
publication generated “the most scandalous reflexions that can be made against the 
lutherans and calvinists.”26  Rondeau continued, “this spanish priest, not satisfied with 
refuting Budeus, has made several reflections foreign to his subject in trying to shew the 
                                                
21 Ibid., 47. 
22 Russkoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo, Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 66 (St. 
Petersburg: Obshchestvo, 1891), 522. 
23 Ibid., 535. 
24 Ibid., 523-524. 
25 Rondeau reported that when the tract was originally published during Peter I’s reign, he forbade the 
Orthodox clergy to defend it.   
26 Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 66, 524.  
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greek church was in danger of being ruined by the lutherans, since the most considerable 
employments of this empire are given to foreigners of that persuasion.”27  Thus, the 
dissemination of these “seditious letters” at court and Examen Veri’s publication in 
Vienna, saturated the court with evocations of Lutherans ruining the Orthodox Church, as 
well as conflict over Lutherans’ influence.  
That propaganda evoking conflicts from the early decades of the century emerged 
in the 1730s and associated the “German” Russian court with Lutheranism reveals 
ongoing religious tensions within and outside Russia as well as resentment of “foreign” 
influence within Russia.28  Examen Veri had the potential to inflame passions on a variety 
of levels.  First, it defended the Russian Orthodox Church against Lutherans and attacked 
both Calvinists and Lutherans specifically, potentially raising denominational passions 
against Russians and Orthodoxy.  Second, its portrayal of Russia as dominated by 
Lutherans could have alienated Catholics in the HRE at a time when the emperor 
depended upon Russia’s military assistance. We shall see below that Protestants in 
Austria and Poland faced forced migration and church demolition in 1732, the same year 
the Duke of Illyria published Examen Veri.  As copies circulated in 1733, did readers 
consider Russia an oppressive, Lutheran force attempting to control Poland? How would 
Catholics respond to an evocation of the Jansenist controversy and/or consider the 
Russian alliance with the emperor?  Next, Orthodox Christians living outside of Russia, 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 By contrast, the French editor of an Italian officer’s anti-Russian tract Muscovian Letters emphasized 
Anna’s captivity under foreign domination, but not the Lutheran issue.  The French edition was published 
in Paris in 1735 and an English version in 1736.  The British editor retained the original introduction.  
Though a more comprehensive survey of anti-Russian European tracts is necessary, this suggests that the 
religious issue did not offer as much propaganda value in France or Britain as it did in Austria.  See 
William Musgrave, Muscovian letters. Containing An Account of the Form of Government, Customs, and 
Manners of that great Empire.  Written By an Italian Officer of Distinction. Translated from the French 
Original, Printed at Paris 1735 (London, 1736), iv – vi. 
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in non-Orthodox lands, might have perceived the current regime as unwilling or unfit to 
protect them.  Finally, identification of the foreign yoke oppressing Russians during 
Anna’s reign as specifically Lutheran, as opposed to “German,” adds a confessional 
dimension to the commonly circulated complaint that Russia suffered under foreign 
domination during the 1730s.29 
Ernst Johann Biron, the figure most associated with Anna’s “German Yoke,” 
became integral to Anna’s court while she served as duchess of the German-speaking 
Duchy of Courland.30  When Peter the Great I renewed the medieval Rus practice of 
securing dynastic marriages with Western European courts, Anna, the daughter of his 
deceased half-brother Ivan V (r. 1682 – 1696), married the Duke of Courland, nephew to 
the King of Prussia.31  The wedding took place in 1710, not long after Peter’s soldiers had 
expelled the Swedes from the duchy during the Great Northern War.  Unfortunately, on 
the way home from their wedding in St. Petersburg, Anna's husband died (apparently as a 
result of alcohol poisoning brought on by Peter’s demanding celebration regimen), and 
his uncle, Ferdinand, became duke.  Due to the war and conflict with the Courland 
                                                
29 Buddeus’ work would also circulate in Russia in the late eighteenth century. Victoria Frede indicates that 
another tract, Theses theologicae de atheism et supersitione (1716), was published twice during Catherine 
II’s reign in 1774 and attributed to the above-mentioned Feofan Prokopovich. She indicates that early in the 
eighteenth century apologetic works that defended Christianity against real or imagined enemies began to 
be imported. Frede focuses on publications from the late eighteenth century, however, and refers to the 
fluid boundaries among Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism as emblematic of that time.  We have 
seen, however, that the same intermingling occurred in Russia in the early part of the century.  Catherine II, 
a German Lutheran who converted to Orthodoxy, embarked on social reforms associated with Baltic 
German Pietism.  See Frede, 133-34.  According to Curtiss, 140, during Peter II’s reign (1727-1730), 
Markel Radishchevski, an archimandrite from a Novgorod monastery, denounced Prokopovich, in part on 
charges of Augustinism and Lutheranism.  
30 Edward C. Thaden and Marianna Forster Thaden, Russia's Western Borderlands, 1710-1870 (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 6. 
31 Courland sits in the southwest corner of present-day Latvia.  On Kievan Rus dynastic marriages with 
Western Europeans, see Christian Raffensperger’s Reimagining Europe: Kievan Rus’ in the Medieval 
World, 988-1146 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
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gentry, the new duke remained in Danzig.32  Anna lived in the duchy's capital, Mitava, 
until she ascended to the Russian throne in 1730.33  She maintained a presence in 
Courland because Russia had no other claim to the duchy; despite Sweden's occupation, 
it still remained under the protection of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.34 Biron, a 
non-noble, entered Anna’s service in approximately 1714 and reportedly quickly became 
her favorite and the most prominent member of her Courland court.  To "ward off 
scandal," she found a poor nobleman who would marry his daughter to Biron and the new 
couple moved into the Duchess' palace, occupying rooms that adjoined her apartments.35  
They reportedly lived in a similar arrangement when Anna became Empress in 1730 until 
her death in 1740.  
Biron was not the only of Anna’s “German” advisors.  Elites such as the 
Levenwolde brothers from Livonia, a German-speaking area removed from Swedish 
control during the Great Northern War, played a prominent role in Anna’s diplomacy and 
foreign policy.  Additionally, Heinrich von Osterman grew up in a Westphalian Lutheran 
pastor's family and joined his brother (who served as Anna Ivanovna and her sister's 
tutor) in Russia in 1697.  After he proved instrumental in negotiating the Peace of Nystad 
in 1710, Peter I chose for Osterman a Russian wife.36  Pavel Iaguzhinskii, a Lithuanian, 
served as organist for the Moscow Lutheran church and became the first Procurator 
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General of the Senate.37  With the exception of Osterman, these individuals were “Baltic 
Germans,” hailing from German-speaking territories that had been under Swedish control 
until the Great Northern War.  While these men disagreed with one another and (in the 
case of Osterman and Biron at least) maintained various allegiances to foreign courts, 
they shared Lutheran roots.  It is also worth noting that Catherine I, Peter I’s second wife 
and successor, met Peter as a result of living in lands occupied by Russian forces during 
the Great Northern War (in 1703 or 1704), and converted to Orthodoxy either from 
Lutheranism or Catholicism.38  
As a result of the Treaty of Nystadt, Baltic German nobles retained special, 
autonomous judicial, administrative, land/peasant control, educational and religious 
rights in areas with tightly controlled landed estates and highly lucrative trading cities 
such as Riga.39  The territories were divided into the corporations of Livland, Estland and 
the Island of Osel; Courland would not become integrated into the Russian Empire until 
1795 as an outcome of the partitions of Poland.  As mentioned above, Baltic Germans 
maintained a disproportionate influence over elite institutions within Russia through the 
nineteenth century.  Moreover, they were a powerful constituency that held religious 
autonomy: the Lutheran church remained the official church in this area and Swedish 
church law stayed in effect until 1832.40  Thus, as an aspect of Russia’s Baltic conquests 
and integration of Baltic German elites, Lutherans, and to some degree Lutheranism, 
became woven into Russian institutions and court culture.  A wedding that took place in 
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St. Petersburg in May of 1733 provides an example of this integration.  When a Major-
General Bismarck married Biron’s sister-in-law in a Lutheran church, Rondeau reported 
that all of the foreign ministers and “almost all the court were present at church, and, after 
the ceremony was over, we had the honour to dine at court. At night there was a ball."41  
While the court and nobility would attend Orthodox Church services on Saints’ Days, or 
for other official celebrations, they were also expected to attend a Lutheran wedding. 
This contrasts sharply with the treatment of Prince Mikhail Golitsyn, who married 
an Italian Catholic woman in Rome after converting in 1729 and attempted to keep the 
event a secret when he returned to Moscow early in Anna’s reign.  When the secret was 
discovered, Anna subjected him to ritual humiliation, making him a cupbearer who 
served the fermented beverage kvass to the Empress at court.  In legal documents Prince 
Golitsyn was then forced to use the name “Prince Kvassnik.” Anna demoted him from an 
infantry major to a page, and she forced him to sit in a giant nest and imitate a hen in 
front of the entire court. The Golitsyns were out of favor at this time, soon after 
attempting to force Anna to submit to the “conditions” that she rejected upon becoming 
empress.  A kinsman supposedly reported the marriage to the court, however, revealing 
that Golitsyns were not singled out solely for their family affiliation.42  Catholicism was 
clearly unacceptable while Lutheranism was officially supported.   
Biron’s access, as a Courlander rather than a Baltic German from annexed lands, 
derived from his role as a favorite.  While Biron did not use every opportunity to leverage 
his position to his advantage, he profited handsomely from his level of influence, 
obtaining estates in Siberia, Ukraine and Livonia, and using negotiations during The War 
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of the Polish Succession to secure the position of Duke of the Duchy of Courland.43  
Though his sense of superiority, proximity to the Empress, and wealth accumulation 
understandably alienated many Russians, in Courland he enjoyed prestige and influence.  
According to Alexander V. Berkis, "if he had behaved like a robber baron in Russia, he 
had also been Courland's patriot. The first period of Biron's rule (1737-1740) was the 
climax of Courland's prosperity during the eighteenth century.”44 
Before Biron became Duke of Courland, his insecurity at the Russian court led 
him to seek protection elsewhere.  This passage from a report written by British diplomat 
George Forbes to King George II (r. 1727 – 1760) in 1733-1734 reveals the diplomat’s 
conception of Biron’s predicament in the year before Russia finally dispatched troops to 
support the emperor: 
Count Biron has thrown himself Intirely into the Emperours Interest, which he 
Espouses on all Occasions as farr as it is consistent with his Duty to his 
Sovereign. But as the Count, his Lady, and Family are Lutherans he seems rather 
to wish for the Protection of some Protestant Power, and often Expresses himself 
disatisfied with the Emperours little Regard for the Protestant Interest.45 
 
Biron developed a close relationship with the British ambassadors at the Russian court 
during this time, and often advocated Emperor Charles VI’s cause at their request, in 
opposition to Prussia’s interests.  If something should happen to the Empress, Biron’s 
lack of popularity in Russia made it necessary to secure protection in other dominions, 
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but he did not imagine surrendering his trust to the Catholic emperor, due to his disregard 
for the “Protestant Interest.”46   
What did it mean for Charles VI to disregard the “Protestant Interest” at this 
particular time?  With the exception of Andrew C. Thompson’s 2006 monograph, 
Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688 – 1756, contemporary historians have 
not focused on confessional dimensions of the Polish Succession crisis.  Generally, 
however, recent historiography has shifted away from the notion that warfare became 
entirely “rationalized” and “secularized” after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.47  Pasi 
Ihalainen contends that as the 1720s began, “the possibility of the outbreak of a religious 
war between Catholics and Protestants in Germany was not yet out of the question” and 
that “grounds for Protestant internationalism, at least in the form of sympathy toward the 
persecuted brethren, were present until at least the Seven Years’ War,” and then declined 
rapidly.48  He claims that solidarity with persecuted Protestants inspired relief efforts, but 
especially united “Protestant members of a particular national community to defend their 
church and country against the potential threat of the same horrors being experienced at 
home.”49  Further, Sugiko Nishikawa refers to England in the early eighteenth century as 
“a member of the European-wide Protestant community.”50  Though Biron may have 
imagined himself as part of an international community of Protestants, he did not 
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advocate uniformly for Protestant powers at court, most notably opposing Prussia’s 
machinations.51  It seems likely that he wanted to retreat to a country where he had both 
secured the sovereign’s favor and could practice his religion. 
Well-publicized confessional strife in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to 
Protestants’ sense of threat in the years leading up to the War of the Polish Succession.52  
Thompson devotes a chapter to the Thorn crisis, a struggle between Jesuits and Lutherans 
in Polish Prussia, which attracted international attention in 1724.53  Civil disorder broke 
out over a dispute during a Catholic procession; both Catholics and Lutherans took 
prisoners.  As a result of Jesuit complaints to the Sejm, the town had to pay steep fines for 
damage to Catholic property, fifteen people were publicly executed, and Catholics took 
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over the last Protestant church in the town.54  Further, the archbishop of Salzburg had 
evacuated 20,000-30,000 Protestants in 1732, and "the Emperor expressed his concern 
over the persistence of pockets of Protestantism within the Austrian lands by forcibly 
resettling a thousand Carinthians and Upper Austrians in Transylvania."55  Mack Walker 
describes the Salzburg expulsion as “the most dramatic religious confrontation in 
Germany after the Thirty Years’ War.”56  Adding further insult, by 1733 Protestants 
could no longer participate in the Polish Sejm.57  
Additionally, negotiations in the early 1730s, surrounding a successor of 
Augustus II as king of Poland, evoked major setbacks faced by Protestants in 1697.  
Then, Augustus II, elector of Saxony, converted from Lutheranism to Catholicism so that 
he could claim the Polish throne, which particularly disillusioned Protestants who 
remembered Saxony as "the birthplace of the Reformation."58  Simultaneous with 
Augustus' conversion in 1697, the fourth clause of the Treaty of Ryswick (ending the 
War of the League of Augsburg) allowed for churches that Catholics had claimed during 
Louis XIV's decimation of the Palatinate to remain Catholic after the departure of French 
troops.59  Thompson has demonstrated that overturning the Ryswick clause preoccupied 
many Protestants within the Empire during the lead-up to The War of the Polish 
Succession.  He indicates, “the Peace of Westphalia had supposedly frozen the 
confessional balance in the Reich and further changes were not allowed.  Approval by the 
Reich of the 1697 treaty therefore enabled a shift in the confessional balance that would 
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not otherwise have been licit.”60  Protestants worried because this development made the 
1648 Westphalia treaty, which set the number of Protestant and Catholic churches, seem 
amendable rather than a fundamental of Imperial law.61  The issue raised “broader 
implications beyond the local situation in the Palatinate.  Protestants perceived an 
increase in catholic power in the Empire.”62 On the other hand, W.R. Ward indicates that 
Catholics believed "Westphalia itself was an act of force in which they had been pillaged 
by the Protestants with foreign assistance from France and Sweden."63  Negotiations 
surrounding the Treaty of Utrecht at the conclusion of the War of Spanish Succession in 
1713 placed the fourth clause back on the table, but Pope Clement XI remained 
unmoved.64 The Corpus Evangelicorum within the HRE had continually, unsuccessfully, 
attempted to convince the Emperor to nullify the clause.65  Thompson contends that 
Charles’ need for support from princes and electors in 1733 provided an opportunity for 
Protestants to use revocation of the clause as a negotiating point.66  However, when 
France attacked, they did not hold out until the emperor changed his mind about 
Ryswick.67 
Despite much hand wringing, the Protestant powers did not take definitive action 
in support of Protestants in Poland.  In 1731, the Prussian, English, Dutch and Russian 
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representatives at the Polish court had united to support religious dissidents.  Russia and 
Prussia also agreed to join together to support Orthodox and Protestant dissidents in 
Warsaw.68  In July of 1733, however, Rondeau wrote to Lord Harrington, Secretary of the 
Northern Department, indicating that the court considered Prussia an unreliable partner 
and Empress Anna wanted to settle a treaty with George II “to secure for the future the 
protestants of Poland in the free exercise of their religion.”69  The following week, Forbes 
wrote to Harrington indicating that one of Anna’s advisors complained of Woodward’s 
“reservedness in relation to the election of Poland,” appealing to “His Majesty's paternal 
care” for dissidents there.70  In August, however, Harrington pointed out that, though 
Anna’s minister had persisted in promoting a treaty of alliance, he dropped the notion of 
entering into a treaty on behalf of Polish dissidents.71  Forbes explained that the issue was 
not raised again because he insisted on George II’s “good offices” for them, carried out 
by Woodward in Warsaw, and the impossibility of backing up such a treaty by sea or 
land.72  In a private elaboration Harrington explained that George does not want to enter 
into a treaty to protect Protestants because it might “exasperate [The Poles] more, and 
make them eager to show their power and their freedom by some warm acts of bigotry.”73   
Meanwhile, in Poland’s religiously charged atmosphere, George Woodward, 
British envoy to Poland and Saxony, followed commands regarding advocacy for 
Protestants in Warsaw as communicated by George II through Lord Harrington, Secretary 
of the Northern Department. From the summer of 1732 to November of 1733, Harrington 
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mixed concern for the fate of Polish Protestants with an emphasis on subduing fervent 
reaction to the demolition of Protestant churches.74  George II encouraged Protestants to 
seek redress for persecution, but eschewed entanglement in plots, and sought to prevent 
violent responses. 
The British also took this tempered approach in relations with Russia.  Though 
Britain sought neither a defensive nor a religious alliance with Russia, its envoys worked 
tirelessly to settle a commercial treaty.  Russia pressed for a defensive guarantee 
continuously and Britain would not relent.  Before the French had invaded the HRE, 
when the emperor reneged on his treaty-mandated duty to dispatch troops to secure the 
Polish election along with the Russians, British diplomats defused the issue, convincing 
Biron that the emperor’s move would give the French a pretext to attack.  Then, in 
autumn 1734, when the emperor began asking for treaty-mandated Russian troop support 
in his Rhineland territories, the Russians demurred.  A triangulation emerged as Russia 
stalled both in signing the commercial treaty and deploying troops to support the 
emperor.  Meanwhile, despite consistent pressure from Russia, the British avoided 
entering into a defensive alliance with it and never committed to assisting the emperor 
militarily. 
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In late February 1735, Rondeau wrote to Harrington that the envoy from Vienna 
continued, unsuccessfully, to pressure the Russians to send troops to Poland to assist the 
emperor.  He thought that Anna delayed not only to see whether George II would assist 
the emperor, but also due to Biron’s displeasure over misrepresentations from Vienna 
regarding his Silesian land purchase.  Rondeau wrote that Biron had “bought of late the 
county of Warttenberg in Silesia […] and when general count Levenvolde was last at 
Vienna, that ministry as good as promised him that, in case count Biron bought the above 
estate, he should be permitted to build a lutheran church at Warttenberg, which liberty the 
emperor now refuses to grant, saying it is contrary to the laws of the country.”  Rondeau 
elaborated that because “nothing can be done here without his consent, the emperor must 
find some way to satisfy him, or else his affairs will go on but very slowly at this 
court.”75  Soon after, he reported rumors that the issue had been resolved as a result of 
assurances that Charles VI would allow Biron to “build a lutheran church on estates he 
has bought in Silesia…”76  Russia did deploy troops and a coin dated November 4, 1736 
commemorates the consecration of Biron’s estate chapel.77  Biron's hindrance of the 
Russo-Austrian troop deployment agreement does not appear in contemporary historical 
accounts focusing specifically on the war, which portray the events following Charles' 
request for troops as swift, or do not mention the delay.78 
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While Rondeau indicates that Biron bought the land from the emperor, 
correspondence reveals that the Silesian land had been used as a gift to influence a series 
of notables at the Russian court.  In late December of 1729, at the end of Peter II’s reign, 
Rondeau expressed concern about the Duke of Illyria’s inability to counterbalance 
Vienna at court because Emperor Charles VI planned to “give prince Alexey 
Grigoriewitz Dolgoruky, the promised Czarinna’s father, the principality in Silesia that 
did belong to prince Menshikoff and was the bribe which engaged that unfortunate 
gentleman to do all that the court of Vienna desired at that time.”79  Prince Menshikov, a 
favorite of Peter I who had taken control in the first months of Peter II’s reign, was 
disgraced in large part due to Dolgorukii influence.  Now, as Prince Dolgorukii’s 
daughter planned to marry Peter II, he would receive the emperor’s gift.  This reveals 
Rondeau’s perception that this particular land grant was instrumental in Menshikov’s 
allegiance to Vienna.  As Peter II died soon after this dispatch, and the Dolgorukiis were 
disgraced, the emperor no longer had a reason to curry Prince Dolgorukii’s favor.  
Early into Anna’s reign, Biron became the most evident beneficiary of Emperor 
Charles VI’s largesse.  The dynamic shifted after Vienna and Britain became allies in 
1731.  Now, rather than expressing concern over the emperor’s ability to wield influence 
with the land, Rondeau sought London’s assistance in bestowing it upon Biron.  In late 
September, near the end of the second year of Anna’s reign, Rondeau wrote to London 
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that Vienna’s resident, Count Wratislau, asked him to send a dispatch requesting that the 
British court “try to engage the court of Vienna to give count Biron the estates in Silesia 
formerly designed for prince Menshikoff and at the same time to make him a prince of 
the empire…” Rondeau was convinced that this action would “infallibly secure count 
Biron in our interest.”80  Wratislau wanted it to appear as though Rondeau generated the 
idea because he thought otherwise the emperor would look unfavorably on the 
suggestion.  Rondeau did not indicate that the action would secure Vienna’s interests 
alone, but “our” interests: Britain’s and the Empire’s.  On November 18, 1732 Rondeau 
indicated, “Count Wratislau told me yesterday, that he had been informed from his court 
that the emperor, his master, would give count Biron a considerable estate in Silesia, 
which he had acquainted his excellency with, so that now he is sure the french will not be 
able to do anything here.”81  Thus, Wratislau perceived that the land gift would prevent 
Biron from becoming susceptible to French influence. 
In 1735 Rondeau indicated that Biron purchased the land, whereas in 1732 he had 
personally asked London to convince the court of Vienna to give it as a gift.  It seems 
most likely that few knew that Biron received the land as a gift.  When Levenwolde 
negotiated in Vienna over the church construction issue, he could easily have thought that 
Biron purchased the land, as the courts likely did not want it known that the transaction 
was designed to secure allegiance. 
Although the emperor’s relenting to Biron seems to have caused the long-awaited 
troop deployment, all of the circumstances related to this Austrian-British-Russian 
triangulation resolved in February and March of 1735.  On February 15, Rondeau 
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reported Anna’s hesitation about deploying troops as though she awaited word on what 
action George II would take to support the emperor.82  Within days, Rondeau received a 
copy of a resolution between the States General and Britain regarding the war; Anna and 
her ministers must also have received it around that time.  On March 1, 1735, Rondeau 
reported that Anna would send troops, Charles VI would allow Biron to build his church, 
and the commercial treaty would finally be ratified.  On March 16 Rondeau indicated that 
Anna was pleased with the part of the accommodation plan relating to Poland, the treaties 
were officially ratified, and within days Anna had dispatched orders for the deployment 
of 20,000 troops.83  As discussed further in Chapter 2, the timing strongly suggests that in 
lieu of a much sought-after defensive alliance Russia leveraged the Anglo-Russian 
Commercial Treaty of 1734 for the resolution drafted by the States General, agreeing to 
ratify the commercial treaty only after receiving the resolution.  With those issues settled, 
and Biron able to build his church on the land the British had helped him to obtain, 
Russia then deployed troops.  Biron’s side deal, then, seems to have been an aspect of 
both the formal Austro-Russian alliance mandating the troop commitment as well as 
indirect reciprocity among the three empires that allowed them to assist one another 
without entering into official alliances that would further inflame hostilities. 
That the church transaction did not rank in importance with the commercial and 
military items that simultaneously resolved amplifies its significance.  This is the only 
time that the correspondence covering Anna’s reign, and collected in the Russkoe 
istoricheskoe obshchestvo volumes, reveals that a British diplomat wrote to the king from 
St. Petersburg requesting a quid-pro-quo favor for any individual.  At a time when 
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Charles VI undertook so much anti-Lutheran activity, allowing Biron to build a church 
was apparently not worth securing the favorite’s allegiance.  That it took the threat of 
withholding the troops Charles so desperately needed to force him to relent reveals the 
issue’s significance to the emperor.   
After tensions in Poland subsided with Augustus’ victory secure, and plans began 
for the Diet of Pacification in August of 1735, Russia took a measured approach toward 
advocacy for Protestants.  On August 2, Rondeau wrote that the Russian envoy in 
Warsaw would join with Woodward to support Protestants at the Diet.84  On August 30, 
Rondeau reported that he assured the Protestant representative from Warsaw at the 
Russian court that Woodward would work in concert with the Russian envoy.  He had 
heard however, that the Russian minister was ordered “to take the greatest care not to 
endanger the breaking of the diet…. by insisting too much on redressing the Protestant’s 
[sic] grievances,” since Augustus would settle them in the next diet if they failed 
initially.85  On September 6 Rondeau reported that the Danish and Prussian envoys had 
urged Anna to attend to the Protestants but that some thought the Prussian king sought to 
cause difficulty for the diet through such advocacy rather than provide relief.  This 
correspondence reveals that religious tensions continued to simmer as the Polish 
succession crisis subsided and demonstrates awareness that religious issues could be 
exploited to obstruct peace proceedings.   
Unlike the princes and electors in the HRE who hoped to use overturning 
Ryswick as leverage, Biron’s access at the Lutheran-friendly Russian court allowed him 
to add one more Lutheran church to Silesia.  Though Silesia had seen an increase in the 
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number of Protestant churches subsequent to 1697, continued persecution of Silesian 
Lutherans throughout the first half of the eighteenth century made them particularly 
grateful for the assistance of Protestant powers.  Pasi Ihalainen notes that before the 
Swedish king Charles XII entered into the Altranstadt Treaty with the emperor during the 
Great Northern War, allowing 120 churches to be returned to Protestants, “Lutheran 
Silesians considered Charles XII a messianic figure who would come to their help.”86  
Further, “the sufferings of Silesian Lutherans at the hands of the Counter-Reformation 
made news in Protestant papers up to 1740, when Frederick the Great of Prussia put an 
end to forced conversions of Lutheran parishes and earned himself the honorary title of a 
defender of Protestantism.”87  Had the territory remained in Charles VI’s hands, Biron 
might have become legendary as a defender of Protestantism.  Instead, Frederick the 
Great (r. 1740-86), the Protestant king of Prussia, annexed Silesia within a few years of 
the church’s construction.  The Prussian king’s boldness changed Silesia’s trajectory and 
launched Europe into the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), rendering Biron’s 
feat unworthy of even a footnote in English-language historiography.  In the years before 
Frederick’s annexation, however, the impact could have been significant.  In Wartenberg, 
the county Biron received, the last church in which Protestants had been allowed to 
worship burned down in 1637 and many of the congregation who could not receive 
permission to reconstruct emigrated.88  Under the permit he received, nobles and 
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townspeople could attend services.89  Thus, though Biron played a small, and largely 
unacknowledged, role in restoring Lutheran worship in Silesia, to Lutherans in 
Wartenberg who could now worship locally, Biron may have seemed as heroic as Charles 
XII or Frederick the Great.   
Considering these two incidents, the Buddeus refutation and Biron’s Silesian 
church construction, has allowed us to see that the Russian court remained a site of 
interdenominational convergence and conflict in the 1730s.  During the lead-up to the 
War of the Polish Succession, Europe confronted dynastic changes that evoked religious 
tensions from decades earlier in the century while areas of Central and Eastern Europe 
encountered forced relocation of Lutherans and Protestant church destruction.  At the 
same time, the publication of the refutation of Buddeus in Vienna evoked the contentious 
period of Peter I’s church reforms as well as the Jansenist controversy.  During Peter I’s 
reign, as influential Baltic Germans became integrated into the elite as a result of the 
Great Northern War, Peter wrested autonomy from his church and created a new blend of 
sacral authority among the elite.  Accusations of Lutheran sympathies emerged during 
Peter’s time and bubbled up again through the Buddeus refutation as Baltic Germans 
became prominent during Anna Ivanovna’s reign.  While Russia remained officially 
Orthodox and the court adhered to Orthodox devotional ceremonial rites, Lutherans were 
integrated enough into the court that a favorite could used the empire’s leverage to ensure 
that a Lutheran church would be constructed on land he received to do a foreign power’s 
bidding.  We see that in the 1730s Russia remained a locus of interdenominational cross-
fertilization and conflict, integrated into the interdenominational struggles across Europe.  
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Recognizing the “Lutheran Yoke” had roots in Peter’s reign, and that Catherine II’s 
reforms are associated with her Pietism, points the way toward future work on the role of 
religion in elite integration and cultural transfer throughout eighteenth century Russia. 
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Though Russia sought Britain’s military assistance against the French in the War 
of the Polish Succession (1733-35), it could not use contemporaneous commercial treaty 
negotiations as leverage to induce the British to enter into a formal defensive alliance.90  
In his 1938 monograph on the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734, Douglas K. 
Reading attributed Russia’s capitulation to the treaty without the guarantee to “the real 
dependence of the new Russian economic organism upon English commerce.”91  For 
Reading, the proof of this dependence lay in “the successful conclusion of the 
commercial treaty by the English notwithstanding their outright rejection of Muscovite 
political advances.”92  This notion of Russia’s dependence fit with Reading’s contention 
that the treaty represented “the first formal commercial agreement ever concluded 
between, on the one side, the most industrially and commercially advanced of all the 
contemporary European states, Great Britain, and on the other side, the most backward 
and undeveloped of these same states, Russia."93  The Russian/East European 
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“backwardness” trope has not disappeared since the 1930s, and contemporary work on 
the treaty negotiations emphasizes, as Reading did, individual statespersons’ goals and 
the failure of Anna Ivanovna’s chancellor Baron von Osterman to insist on a reciprocal 
guarantee.94  That the British did not offer a reciprocal defensive guarantee, however, did 
not reflect Britain’s superior diplomatic maneuvering.  Simultaneous with the treaty’s 
ratification in early 1735, the British and Holland’s States General negotiated with the 
French to secure an agreement that ended the most intensive phase of Russia’s 
involvement in the War of the Polish Succession.  Thus, Russia obtained its desired 
outcome without a formal alliance.  Soon after, the British desperately sought a defensive 
alliance with Russia but the court demurred throughout the rest of Anna Ivanovna’s reign.  
Thus, Russia did not abandon its hopes for a defensive alliance because its new, 
westward-looking “economic organism” depended upon Britain.   
Along with this conception of Russian dependence, contemporary explanations 
for the commencement of formal trade relations with Britain during Anna Ivanovna’s 
reign have focused on the “old” Russian nobility’s displacement by a new, Western-
looking elite.95  More than a relatively simple issue of “old” and “backward” vs. “new” 
and “Western,” British and Russian factional issues mixed with dynastic and strategic 
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considerations to impede a formal commercial agreement in the decades before Anna 
Ivanovna’s reign.  The “Old Russian” nobility were not anti-western and many, in fact, 
preferred the British to “Germans” at court.  Aside from to the resolution of factional and 
territorial/strategic issues related to the Duke of Holstein’s claim on Schleswig, the factor 
that most contributed to Russia’s formalization of commercial relations was Britain’s 
détente with Austria, Russia’s primary ally, in 1731.96  That Russia engaged in formal 
relations with Britain and then leveraged the commercial treaty for Britain’s and the 
States General’s resolution of the Polish Succession crisis reveals that Russia acted 
strategically based on its current alliances and defensive needs rather than overcoming its 
“backward” isolation in the wake of Peter the Great’s reforms.   
An overview of Russo-British relations during the first part of the eighteenth 
century will provide context for the renewal of Anglo-Russian relations during Anna 
Ivanovna’s reign.97  English and British sovereigns consistently and unsuccessfully 
pressed for the conclusion of a commercial treaty throughout the first two decades of the 
eighteenth century as Russia gained a position of strength through its conquests in the 
Great Northern War.  From at least 1705, Queen Anne sought such a treaty, using 
admittance into the Grand Alliance as leverage in 1707, and making additional overtures 
in 1711 and 1715.  George I would continue to pursue a treaty of commerce from 1716 to 
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1720, at which time, as Russia had obtained a more advantageous strategic position, Peter 
I consistently used entry into a defensive alliance as leverage.98   
 Britain’s factional issues also impacted Russia’s approach to the British.  As a 
result of its new supremacy over Sweden, in 1718 Russia replaced that nation as the 
Jacobites’ focus for foreign support.  While two of Peter’s closest friends and advisors 
actively advocated for the Jacobite cause, and in 1719 there had reportedly been talk of 
his supporting the Duke of Holstein’s bid for the Swedish throne and an effort to 
reestablish Jacobite rule in England through a Scottish invasion, Peter continually 
reaffirmed his lack of Jacobite interest in diplomatic correspondence with the English 
court.99  When open hostilities emerged in 1720, in the form of a military challenge from 
the English in the Baltic, Peter assured merchants that he “[did] not condescend to blame 
the English people for this measure, but only the Hanoverians and their party.”100  After 
many protestations about Russia's lack of participation in Jacobite intrigue, this openly 
anti-Hanoverian rhetoric marks a distinct shift.  
 In 1724, the Duke of Holstein married Catherine I’s and Peter’s daughter, Anna 
Petrovna. After Catherine I's ascension upon Peter's death in 1725 we see continuity in 
factional influence and a more pronounced alliance between the Russian sovereign and 
the Jacobite cause.  In 1725, Europe divided into an alliance between Austria and Spain 
on the one hand, and the Hanover Alliance of Britain, France, the United Provinces, and 
Prussia on the other.  Davies indicates that "Russia as well as Austria had reason to fear 
the Hanover League, seeing it as an instrument by which Britain could block Russian 
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interests in the Baltic" and Prussia could induce Sweden to join.101  Catherine I openly 
supported her son-in-law's Swedish monarchical aims and became involved in 
international Jacobite plotting. 102  It is difficult to know what to make of these reports of 
factional alliances at the Russian court as the conflicting information could have emerged 
as an effect of disinformation, dissimulation, or misunderstanding. Thus, while 
supporting the Duke of Holstein clearly coincided with Catherine I's advocating the 
Jacobite cause, it is difficult to discern the level of commitment within the rest of the 
Russian court.  Catherine I's death in May of 1727 seemingly ended Russia's official 
support of the Jacobites.  Meanwhile, George II claimed the English crown months later, 
reaffirming Hanoverian legitimacy and extinguishing Jacobite hopes. 
 By August of 1728 England had dispatched Thomas Ward and Claudius Rondeau 
to St. Petersburg to attend to British trade issues, but as the envoys remained concerned 
primarily with wresting military textile contracts from the Prussians, they were unable to 
effect an entente between Britain and Russia.103  This was during the short reign of young 
Peter II (r. 1727-1730) who spent his minority first under Menshikov and then the 
Dolgorukii and Golitsyn families.  As the Golitsyn and Dolgorukii families took control, 
the court returned to Moscow in early 1728, indicating a major break with symbolic and 
practical aspects of the Petrine legacy.104  This has been portrayed as a “backwards” or 
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reactionary move and the Dolgorukiis especially have often been referred to as 
xenophobic.105  A regime change in Russia soon followed when Anna Ivanovna became 
empress early in 1730.  Then, in 1731, Russia minimized the threat to British interests in 
the Baltic by disallowing a potential heir to the Russian throne from controlling the duchy 
of Holstein.106  Additionally, in 1731 the British and Austrians reconciled through the 
second Treaty of Vienna.  Later that year, at the suggestion of the Austrian envoy to St. 
Petersburg, the College of Foreign Affairs indicated that it would resume official 
diplomatic relations with Britain.107  By the summer of 1732 Baron von Osterman began 
discussing the possibility of a commercial treaty with a defensive guarantee. 
This overview of early-eighteenth-century Anglo-British relations reveals that a 
number of factional and geostrategic considerations prevented the nations from seriously 
deliberating about a commercial agreement from 1720 to 1732.  Prior to that time, while 
the British court sought a trade agreement, Peter I continually used the need for a 
reciprocal defensive alliance as leverage.  Philip Clendenning’s analysis, on the other 
hand, does not address factionalism and geostrategic considerations, characterizing the 
transformation that took place in Russo-British relations from the conclusion of the Great 
Northern War in 1721 to the 1740s as possible due to a broad social transformation.108  
According to Clendenning, Peter I’s “new aristocracy” displaced the “old conservative 
aristocratic families,” including the Dolgorukiis and Golitsyns, who in this period are 
most well known for attempting to impose the famous “Conditions” on Anna when the 
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nobility chose her to rule after Peter II’s death.109  We saw, in actuality, that Peter I’s 
insistence on a defensive alliance, Jacobite sympathies, and outright Jacobite advocacy, 
prevented the Russian and British courts first from entering into a commercial agreement 
and then from engaging in any sort of diplomacy from 1720-28, with the Austro-British 
alliance providing the opportunity for a renewal of formal relations in 1731. 
Clendenning relies upon the diplomatic correspondence of Edward Finch, who 
replaced Claudius Rondeau as resident at the Russian court after his untimely death, near 
the end of Anna Ivanovna’s reign, in 1739.  Finch wrote that the Old Rus showed no 
interest in a commercial treaty with a European nation but rather wanted to continue to 
favor “Asiatics.”110  As Britain had already entered into the commercial treaty of 1734 at 
this time, Clendenning might have been referring to the renewal of the treaty in 1742.  
Since Clendenning has identified a wide scale Petrine social transformation with Russia’s 
readiness to enter into a commercial agreement, however, examining what the nobility 
expressed during Rondeau’s early years in Russia, prior to commencement of the 
negotiations over the 1734 treaty, should tell us more than what Finch observed in the 
early 1740s.  Rondeau made many observations about the Old Rus that counter 
assumptions about their association with “backwardness.”  Rondeau’s Old Rus often 
preferred the British to “German” interests and considered it beneficial to maintain 
friendly relations with them.  
According to Rondeau, the Old Rus were friendly to Mecklenburg and in 
opposition to the Dolgorukiis. During Peter II’s reign, Rondeau mentioned that the "old 
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rus nobility" wanted to see the young tsar marry the daughter of the Duke of 
Mecklenburg instead of a Dolgorukii.111  This is significant because Rondeau 
characterized the Old Rus in opposition to the Dolgorukiis who are conventionally seen 
as bastions of backwardness and xenophobia.  Second, these Old Rus preferred dynastic 
marriage to a Western foreigner over a Russian noble.   
Rondeau also portrayed the Old Rus as friendly to the British and in opposition to 
the Courlanders and Germans.  When Rondeau first mentioned Ernst Johann Biron on 
May 11, 1730, he noted that many from Courland were in favor at court, which 
displeased the “old rus.”112  Soon after, Rondeau noted, "all the old russ are our friends 
and begin to murmur very much, that Her Majesty has so many courlanders and germans 
about her person.”113  Thus, the Old Rus did not dislike foreigners in general, as they 
preferred the British, but disliked the disproportionate number of people in Anna’s court 
from the Duchy of Courland and other Germanophone areas.  This suggests that even 
without the disproportionate influence of Germanophone advisors, the Russian nobility 
would have accepted a commercial treaty with Britain in subsequent years. 
Rondeau also indicated that the Old Rus disliked Austria and Baron von 
Osterman.  As this was prior to the Anglo-Austrian détente in 1731, Britain still worked 
against Austria’s interests at the Russian court.  When the Dutch envoy arrived at St. 
Petersburg, Rondeau stated, "He will, I don't doubt, join with us to weaken the emperor's 
interest at this court, which is yet very considerable, though he has all the old russ against 
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him.”114  Rondeau also thought that Osterman, who engineered the alliance with Austria, 
might have been afraid that he would be unable to persuade the Old Rus to meet Russia’s 
troop deployment obligation to Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI (r. 1711-1740) in case 
of war.115  Rondeau elaborated that Paul Ivanovitch Iaguzhinskii and others of the Old 
Rus nobility had tried to lessen Osterman's power, and described him as "almost the only 
person who… supported the german interest in this country since the going away of the 
duke of Holstein."116  Thus, the Old Rus disliked Osterman, Austria, and “the German 
interest.” 
Though the Golitsyns have been associated with the “backwards” retreat to 
Moscow during Peter II’s reign, and the attempt to impose conditions upon Anna when 
she took power, Rondeau described one of the clan as a friend to Britain.  When Field 
Marshal Golitsyn died, Rondeau noted his passing as regretted by Anna and the army and 
then described him as "a very honest old russ, incapable to be bribed, seeking always the 
real advantage of this country, and consequently our friend."117  Thus, an Old Rus from a 
notoriously “backward” family saw that it was best for his country to ally with Britain. 
Rondeau then described the frustration of the Old Rus nobility as a result of their 
exclusion from Anna’s confidence.  Rondeau indicated that Biron, the Levenwolde 
brothers, Paul Ivanovitch Iaguzhinskii, and Osterman had the most access and 
influence.118  Iaguzhinskii, the Old Rus, was the only among this crew who was Britain’s 
“real friend,” as Vienna and Prussia had bribed Biron and Count Levenwolde.  This made 
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Rondeau fear that Anna would send 20,000 troops to Vienna per the 1726 defensive 
alliance with Russia, and act that he thought might make the Old Rus openly rebel.119   
We have seen, then, that in Rondeau’s nomenclature, the Old Rus revealed a 
variety of overlapping and contradictory characteristics.  Without becoming mired in 
factional issues it is possible to say that there were Russian elites who favored diplomatic 
and commercial relations with the British over “Germans.”  Yet, it was the “Germans” 
who oversaw negotiations for the Anglo-Russian Commercial treaty of 1734.  Clearly it 
is difficult to generalize about what constituted Russian “backwardness” in terms of who 
favored ties with the West.  This summation of Anglo-British relations and examination 
of Rondeau’s categorization of the Old Rus certainly reveals that we cannot consider the 
renewal of diplomatic and commercial ties with Britain as the result of forward-moving, 
Petrine progress. 
A closer look at the Golitsyn and Dolgorukii families reveals that, though they 
have been associated with “backwardness,” they maintained long-term contact with the 
West.  LeDonne describes the Dolgorukiis as "very conservative, xenophobic, and 
extremely devout despite their unbearable pride," noting that the clan's proximity to the 
opposition that had gathered around tsarevitch Alexis in 1718 had caused their political 
fortunes to suffer.120  The combination of the return to Moscow during Peter II’s minority 
and LeDonne's portrayal of isolation and religious devotion feeds into constructions of 
the Petrine/Muscovite divide into progressive vs. backward.  It is true that the 
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Dolgorukiis were noted to have resisted the Petrine reforms in dress.121  However, the 
family also boasted a long record of foreign service.  First Grigory Dolgorukii and then 
his son Sergei served as envoys to Warsaw, the only court at which Russia posted 
residents before Peter's reign.  Vasily Lukich Dolgorukii studied in France for over a 
decade before postings in Warsaw and then Denmark in 1707, and was also posted in 
Sweden.122 The family served in the Russian senate from its inception.123  
The Golitsyns also boasted a history of foreign service, as well as state 
appointments.  Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn visited Rome, Naples and Venice, where 
he studied military-defensive topics.  In 1707 he received the appointment of Voyevoda 
of Kiev, the cultural and intellectual capital of Russia, and would become Kiev's 
governor and the lieutenant of Smolensk.124  The area reflected a combination of "Latin, 
Roman and Catholic influence," as well as a mixture of Polish political traditions and 
Lithuanian legal statutes.125  During his time in Kiev, Golitsyn surrounded himself by 
scholars and arranged for translations of texts for Kiev Academy students (primarily from 
French and Polish), at his own behest and on Peter I’s behalf.126  Further, he received an 
appointment to the new College of Revenues in 1719.127  De Madariaga also tells us that 
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the Golitsyn family was well liked in Ukraine, where they held estates, and surmises that 
the restoration of the Hetmanate in 1728 (while the Dolgorukiis and Golitsyns were in 
control during Peter II’s minority) after Peter's elimination of it in 1722 demonstrates 
sympathy for Ukrainian traditions.128   
That neither of these families seems to have had significant Germanophone or 
British ties, but linkages to the Ukraine, Poland and France, might explain why they were 
considered “backward” during a time when Russia was at war with Poland and France.  
The Golitsyns, especially, maintained extensive connections in areas that had been 
annexed by Muscovy in the mid-late-eighteenth century.  Yet, as we saw above, Rondeau 
described Field Marshal Golitsyn as sympathetic to the British.  Again, there do not seem 
to have been straightforward divisions that we can attribute to Old and New Rus.   
Now we shall move on to the significance of Russia’s concluding the 1734 treaty 
without a defensive guarantee, which, as we saw above, was contrary to the Petrine 
legacy of insisting on a reciprocal defensive guarantee.  Michael Bitter explores this issue 
in a manner similar to Douglas Reading’s in 1938, examining the treaty negotiations in 
detail and comparing the approaches of Osterman and Biron.129  Bitter demonstrates that 
in an era known variously as the “Bironovschina” (time of Biron’s rule) or Russia’s era 
under the “German Yoke,” these two Germanophone advisors took very different 
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approaches and Biron did not uniformly dominate.130  Biron did not advocate a defensive 
alliance and eventually his approach won out.  Bitter indicates that Osterman, defeated, 
“adopted his rivals' attitude toward the commercial treaty… and the Russian court settled 
for a policy of strictly commercial engagement with Great Britain.”131  This analysis 
focuses our attention on personal approaches and preferences of statespersons and 
portrays one strategy as overriding another, with Russia “settling” due to pressure from 
Britain and a willingness of some at court to acquiesce.   
 Examining the correspondence from February and March of 1735, however, 
demonstrates that Russia did not simply capitulate to Britain’s demands.  While the treaty 
was concluded in December of 1734, it was not ratified until a few months later, and its 
ratification coincided with a number of significant events.  Per its 1726 alliance with 
Austria, Russia was obligated to assist the Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI when the 
French attacked his territories as part of the War of the Polish Succession.  He had 
repeatedly asked for assistance and Russia delayed.  Meanwhile, Russia had committed 
significant ground forces to securing its installation of the new king Augustus III in 
Poland.  Though Britain and Austria had reconciled by this time, while Hanover 
committed troops to assist the Emperor Charles VI, Britain did not.  On February 15, 
Rondeau reported Anna’s hesitation about deploying troops as though she awaited word 
on what action George II might take to support the emperor as the British king.132  Within 
days, Rondeau received a copy of a resolution drafted by Holland’s States General and 
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Britain indicating that the French-supported, rival claimant to the Polish throne would 
retreat, after which Russia would remove its troops; Anna and her ministers must also 
have received it around that time.  With Anna able to remove her troops to Poland, she 
had the capacity to comfortably assist the emperor.  On March 1, 1735, Rondeau reported 
that Anna would send troops, Charles VI would allow Biron to build a Lutheran church 
on land within the HRE granted to him by the emperor, and the commercial treaty would 
finally be ratified.133  On March 16 Rondeau indicated that Anna was pleased with the 
part of the accommodation plan relating to Poland, the treaties were officially ratified, 
and within days Anna had dispatched orders for 20,000 troops to support the emperor.134  
Meanwhile, Russia relinquished its remaining Persian possessions.  The timing of the 
ratification strongly suggests that in lieu of a much sought-after defensive alliance Russia 
used the commercial treaty as leverage to secure a resolution coordinated by Britain and 
the States General, agreeing to ratify the commercial treaty only after receiving the 
resolution.  Russia did not need Britain’s military commitment if its negotiations 
eliminated the need to maintain a strong presence in Poland so that it could follow 
through on its commitment to Emperor Charles VI.   
 It is difficult to assess how much Britain benefitted from the treaty.  The British 
received most favored nation status and English merchants gained a one-third reduction 
on select tariffs, including on woolen cloth.  This provided a considerable advantage over 
the Prussians, who had dominated this market in military uniform material since 1724 
when they landed formerly British army contracts. Reading indicates that sales of British 
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cloth in Russia increased by about one-third in the decades that followed.135  However, 
we do not know exactly when the increase occurred.  English merchants also received 
permission to import and export goods to and from Persia through Russia, and to pay 
tariff duties in Muscovite coinage rather than reichsdollars, representing a reduction of 
about three percent.  The Persian privilege never became significant to the British and 
was soon revoked.136   Many of the other treaty provisions dealt with freeing English 
merchants from arbitrary action like forced conscription or billeting Russian soldiers, as 
well as corrupt business practices.  Though Reading indicates that in the twenty-five 
years after the treaty the average annual amount of British exports to Russia doubled 
those of the preceding thirty-five years, it is difficult to attribute the increase directly to 
the treaty.137  By 1740, five years after the treaty’s conclusion, British exports to Russia 
were below 1720 levels.  Between 1740 and 1750 they had more than doubled.138  Before 
attributing these phenomena directly to the 1734 treaty, other factors need eliminating, 
and the effects of the treaty’s renewal in 1742 need to be evaluated. 
  Subsequent to the multilateral exchange among Russia, Britain and Austria in 
early 1735, Russo-British diplomacy alternated between disaster and stagnation during 
Anna Ivanovna’s reign.  The British resident at Constantinople so damaged Russian 
interests that, after much urging by Biron and Osterman, King George II finally recalled 
him.139  The tables turned as Britain desperately sought a defensive guarantee in 
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December of 1738 due to renewed threat from Sweden, and Russia demurred; not until 
Elizabeth’s reign, in 1742, would Britain secure its defensive alliance.140  George II 
persistently offered good offices to resolve tensions between Russia and Turkey either to 
be brushed off by the Russians or completely excluded by Turkey in favor of the 
French.141  Osterman expressed frustration at Britain’s unwillingness to threaten the 
Ottomans with military action, or to rebuff them more strongly, but overall seemed to 
have few genuine expectations of British assistance with the Porte.  The coordinated 
action of 1734/35 was the highlight and then Britain’s primary usefulness to Russia lay in 
its ability to negotiate with the emperor. 
 Russia did not overcome the backwardness of the Old Rus to enter into the Anglo-
Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734.  While Germanophone advisors primarily oversaw 
treaty negotiations, the friendliness many Old Rus expressed toward the British suggests 
that, had Anna not ascended, another Russian cabinet could have secured a commercial 
agreement.  Nor did the British carry off a diplomatic coup by forcing Russia to move 
forward without a reciprocal defensive alliance.  Rather, after the resolution of decades of 
factional struggle that strained relations, a formal commercial alliance became possible.  
Additionally, Britain’s reconciliation with Austria made its diplomatic efforts useful in 
the first half of Anna’s reign.  Britain assisted with negotiations to end the War of the 
Polish Succession, freeing up Russia to fulfill its troop commitment to Austria and 
securing Russia’s chosen candidate for the Polish throne.  In exchange, Russia ratified the 
commercial treaty.  Meanwhile, Britain continued to consume the majority of Russia’s 
exports as had been the case for decades and finally, at the end of 1738, tenaciously 
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sought a defensive alliance that Anna Ivanovna’s cabinet never entered into.  The 
formalization of Anglo-British diplomatic and commercial relations in the 1730s was an 
effect of Britain’s détente with Austria and Russia’s ability to use the Anglo-Russian 
Commercial Treaty of 1734 as leverage to secure the mediation that allowed it to remove 
troops from Poland, freeing up troops to support Emperor Charles VI in his Rhineland 
territories. 
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The Russian army would first occupy the territory between the Dniepr and the Don; 
then, in 1737, the Crimea, the Kuban valley, and the Kabardas; in 1738, the low land 
of Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia; and in 1739, it would raise the Russian flag 
over Constantinople, where Anna would be crowned Orthodox empress, the 
counterpart of the Holy Roman Emperor in Frankfurt.142 
 
This passage describes one of the most common contemporary conceptions of Russia’s 
motivation for taking on the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-1739: in search of both religious 
glory and control of the Crimea and Black Sea, Empress Anna Ivanovna and her advisors 
would reclaim the former epicenter of Orthodox Christendom.  Along the way, the 
Russian army would subdue the Crimean Tatars and put an end to borderland incursions.  
These attributions, however, omit additional, important explanations for the war.  While 
rhetoric may have emphasized the religious element, British diplomatic correspondence 
from the Russian court in the years preceding hostilities reveals the importance to Russia 
of maintaining Persia as a buffer to prevent Turkey from taking over territories along the 
Caspian that Russia had recently ceded and/or where it maintained significant trade 
interests.  One major reason for decimating the Crimean Tatars, then, was to prevent 
them from assisting the Ottomans against the Persians in the Caucasus region.  While a 
number of authors mention Russia’s war with Persia in the 1720s, subsequent occupation, 
and strategic and trade interests there, they do not integrate these issues into discussions 
of the Russo-Turkish War.  Russia’s capitulation to the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, 
almost universally considered a humiliating defeat, appears less devastating if considered 
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in light of its maintenance of Persia as a buffer and continued to profit from Caspian 
trade. 
After discussing the source base and reviewing the historiography, we shall move 
on to a summary of Russo-Turkish diplomacy from 1729, just before Anna Ivanovna’s 
reign began, to the conclusion of the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, shortly before the end of 
her reign.  Since the threat of war loomed almost constantly throughout this period, 
looking at the broader context of Russo-Turkish relations enables us to understand the 
causes and context of the 1736-39 war from a wider and deeper perspective than 
considering diplomacy immediately leading up to or during hostilities.  The chronology is 
a consolidation of information related to Turkey from over 1700 pages of British 
diplomatic correspondence between the Russian and British courts from 1729-1739.  
Finally, a discussion of religion based on the correspondence allows us to look at its 
relative importance in opposition to territorial/strategic considerations. 
There are a number of reasons to integrate the British correspondence into the 
overall discussion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39, despite the problematic nature 
of relying on an external party’s accounts.  Historians have made little use of British 
dispatches emanating from the Russian court in often-cited discussions of the war.  
Further, Britain became involved in diplomacy between St. Petersburg and the Porte 
through its resident in Constantinople during the lead-up to the conflict.  Though British 
intervention often harmed rather than hurt Russian interests, or British help was not 
desired, the reports still provide insight into motivations, often through first-hand 
accounts of discussions with top members of Anna’s cabinet or other diplomats at court. 
This extraction of observations of, and participation in, Russo-Ottoman relations does not 
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provide a complete picture, but adds to our understanding of the causes and conclusion of 
the war.  Claudius Rondeau, a British envoy at the court from 1728-1739, wrote most of 
the dispatches.143  
Many attribute Russia’s desire to gain access to the Black Sea, control the 
Crimea, and put an end to Tatar attacks as the chief causes of the Russo-Turkish war.144  
Brian Davies claims, “when war between Russia and the Turks and Crimean Tatars broke 
out in 1735, it was because Russia sought it, having discerned a window of opportunity in 
which to wage it and win the recovery of Azov.”145  According to Karl Roider, Russia 
began seeking pretexts to attack Turkey in the years before the war: in 1733 and 1735 
when Tatar khans marched through Dagestan.146 While these explanations portray Russia 
as awaiting the opportunity for war, Evgenii V. Anisimov suggests that the conflict 
emerged from nowhere, stating, “in the autumn of 1735, Russia, quite unexpectedly, 
recommenced the war against Turkey,” on hold since the Pruth campaign ended in 
1711.147  None of these explanations acknowledge that the two countries had remained on 
the brink of war nearly continuously throughout Anna Ivanovna’s reign.  As we shall see 
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below, avoiding war with Turkey preoccupied much of the court’s energies in the years 
before the outbreak of hostilities. 
Other, often conflicting, explanations focus on the goals of individual 
statespersons.  A. Lentin attributes the outbreak of hostilities to “French agitation at 
Constantinople,” but focuses on the motivations of individuals in Russia’s cabinet.  The 
war supposedly represented a reversal of Osterman’s containment policy; he counseled 
Anna to avoid war but Biron and Munnich overruled him.  Further, Lentin contends that 
“all three were confident of a lightning victory with Austrian help, which would avenge 
the Pruth disaster of 1711, sweep the Turks out of Europe, and revive the tarnished 
prestige of Anna and the German clique.”148  Karl Roider, on the other hand, attributes 
the desire to attain the Black Sea’s northern coast to Osterman.149  Lavender Cassels 
reinforces this notion and also attributes careerism as a motivation for Munnich, portrays 
Biron as seeking to enhance Anna’s renown and to benefit himself, and Anna as desiring 
to debase the Turks.150  The religiously focused explanation for the war that opened this 
chapter, involving the glorification of Anna as restorer of Christianity to Constantinople, 
seems to derive from Munnich’s “Oriental Project.”  Gregory Bruess points out, however, 
that Munnich did not formulate the plan until 1737, the second year of the war, based on 
initial military victories and Austria’s involvement.151  As we shall see below, individual 
statespersons’ aspirations and visions alone do not provide a comprehensive explanation 
for Russia’s pursuit of the war.  
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Additionally, while many authors who discuss the Russo-Turkish War also 
describe events in Persia, including the pivotal threat of the Tatar Khan’s marching 
through Dagestan, those events are not integrated into a diplomatic-strategic context.  
Brian Davies does describe Russian opposition to the march of the Crimean Tatars 
through the Caucasus to assist Sultan Mahmud against the Persians and Nadir Khan, 
indicating that “sending armies to the Caucasus required that they cross Kabarda and 
Daghestan, and moving Tatar troops through Kabarda risked provoking war with 
Russia.”152  He explains that, though under the Treaty of Resht in 1732 Anna had 
“abandoned the occupied provinces along the southern Caspian, destroyed the Russian 
forts south of the Greben’, and pulled Russian forces back to the Terek River…” she still 
sought to protect Christians in the mountains of Kabarda and was not willing to give up 
that area to the Ottomans or Khanate.153  Davies also indicates that the Russians withdrew 
from Derbent in exchange for the ability to trade freely with Bukhara and India.154  As a 
long-term effect of the Russian presence in these territories, however, he claims, 
“although Peter’s Persian War brought Russia no lasting territorial gains in the 
Transcaspian it did serve as a precedent for later Russian imperial interest in the region, 
and it provided the Russian army with valuable experience in mountain warfare and joint 
operations with the fleet.”155  Though he mentions both trade and the need to 
counterbalance the Ottomans, those do not emerge as significant factors necessitating the 
Russo-Ottoman war. 156 
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Though Alfred Rieber does not discuss these aims in conjunction with Anna 
Ivanovna’s strategy, we may view hers as a continuation of Peter I’s efforts to prevent the 
Turks from reoccupying the southern Caucasus, “cut[ting] off the Russian penetration of 
Iran, and jeopardiz[ing] Russia’s commercial and strategic position all along the 
Caucasian and Pontic frontiers.”157  Rieber indicates that though Russia lost western 
Azerbaijan and the Georgian kingdoms to the Ottomans with the 1724 Treaty of 
Constantinople, it maintained control of the south and west coasts of the Caspian.158  
According to Galina M. Yemelianova, the Giandzi agreement of 1735 forced Russia to 
cede control of the Caspian to Iran.  Though the Russians gave up Derbent, she indicates 
that they “managed to strengthen their positions in northern Dagestan by founding the 
Russian town of Kyzliar.”159  Further, Rieber indicates that Ghilan remained an important 
center of trade for Russia through the 1780s, suggesting that occupying it became less 
important than maintaining commerce.160  Rieber describes Zubov’s 1795 Caucasus 
campaign under Catherine II in the context of intervening on behalf of Georgia against 
Aga Muhammed Khan’s claims.  Catherine sought to assist the Georgian king without 
alarming the Porte and her general “followed Peter the Great’s campaign trail along the 
Caspian coast as a way of demonstrating Russia’s interest in protecting its commercial 
interests and keeping the south Caucasus free from domination by either the Qajars or the 
Ottomans.”161  If we can attribute strategic and commerce-related motivations to Peter I 
and Catherine II, we can certainly recognize that Anna Ivanovna likely sought to 
maintain a similar buffer without the human and financial cost of occupying the Persian 
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territories.  Though Crimean supply lines were difficult to maintain and the war took an 
enormous human toll, fighting in, and maintaining a presence in, the Persian territories 
would have proven much more expensive over the long run. 
 Jos J.L. Gommans’ emphasis on the importance of the Iranian silk trade to Russia 
over the eighteenth century bolsters the notion that Persia served as an important strategic 
buffer against the Ottoman Empire for economic reasons.  During Peter’s reign, the 
Armenians of Julfa in suburban Isfahan received generous trading rights in Russia, 
maintaining a virtual monopoly on silk imports.  Gommans estimates that by the middle 
of the century, “as much as one third of the total Iranian silk production was directed 
towards Moscow and the market towns of Central Europe.”  He describes Russo-Iranian 
trade as increasing over the eighteenth century “partly as a result of the enormous growth 
of the Russo-Siberian silver output, and indicates, “after the eclipse of Safavid Iran the 
Julfa Armenians were increasingly replaced by their compatriots from northern Iran, 
Russia, and Central Europe.”162  This contention runs counter to work indicating that the 
emphasis on trade shifted toward the east, away from Astrakhan.  Scott Levi suggests that 
attention turned to overland trade with Khiva and Bukhara through Orenburg due to 
Nadir Shah’s oppression of Amenian and Indian merchants, disrupting their activities 
Astrakhan.163  Arcadius Kahan, however, seems to associate the growth of Orenburg, 
Troisk and Semipalatinsk with Russia’s concerns over Chinese tensions.164  
Yemelianova’s, Reiber’s and Gommans’ work strongly suggests that even if Russia 
promoted and developed Orenburg trade, Persia and the Caspian trade maintained 
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strategic value for Russia and it continued to derive benefit from Persia’s remaining a 
buffer zone. 
 Just as many historians point to the need to control the Black Sea as a primary 
cause of the war, that the Russians could keep Azov only as an unfortified town, and had 
to move their cargo in Turkish ships, emerge as the most-cited humiliating aspect as the 
Treaty of Belgrade that concluded the war in 1739.165  Some gains are also 
acknowledged.  According to Brian Davies, in lieu of territory, the Russian army again 
and again vanquished Tatars and Ottomans with few losses, “exposed the vulnerability of 
the Ottoman fortress chains on the Dnestr and Bug as well as Dnepr and Don, the front-
line Ottoman defenses in Pontic Europe,” and along with the Kalmyk Horde and Don 
Host, “greatly reduced the aggressive capabilities of the Crimean Khanate and the Kuban 
Horde.”  Davies concludes that, after two centuries, Left Bank Ukraine and southern 
Russia had become nearly invulnerable to Crimean Tatar raids.166  Shaw sees advantages 
in the sultan’s becoming responsible for Tatar raids, and the Russians’ ability to trade 
within the Ottoman Empire and travel to holy places, enabling them to stir up Christians.  
Additionally, they maintained a strong military reputation in Europe, revealing that 
successors had capably continued to develop Peter I’s modernization.  Finally, the efforts 
informed advances against the Ottomans later in the century.167  Though Davies mentions 
the reduction of the Crimean Khanate and Kuban Horde, who could go to Turkey’s aid in 
the Caucasus, no one mentions preventing Turkey from encroaching on the Caspian. 
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While the chronology below contradicts many historiographic conceptions, one of 
the most flagrant is the notion that Russia and Austria began the war simultaneously and 
with a concerted plan.  Peter F. Sugar notes, “Before Russia moved she came to an 
agreement with [the Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI] in Vienna, proof once more of 
how in the eighteenth century no great power felt secure to act on her own.  After the 
conclusion of the alliance the Russians started hostilities in 1736….”168  Shaw presents a 
variation in this by indicating, “the way for war was paved by a territorial agreement 
between Russia and Austria, with the former to get the Crimea and Azov and the latter 
Bosnia and Herzegovina…Russia then sent an ultimatum to the sultan denouncing him 
for a long series of violations of the Treaty of Pruth…169  Aleksandr Kamenskii repeats 
this refrain: “In 1735, the two allies entered into war against the Ottoman Empire, during 
which Russian Troops under the command of Munnich seized and ravaged the Crimea 
and won a number of striking victories along the Sea of Azov and Moldavia….”170  The 
diplomatic correspondence makes clear that Austria did not enter the war with Russia in 
1735.  The emperor could not enter into hostilities in 1736 because his troops were held 
up with the evacuation of the Spanish and French from territories he claimed during the 
War of the Polish Succession.171  Although the Austrians and Russians drafted an 
operational plan for 1737, well into the year the emperor continued to attempt to act as a 
mediator, even at the Congress of Niemerof.172  As we shall see below, according to 
Rondeau’s recollection, it was Vienna’s lackluster performance in Hungary that provided 
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the Porte with the confidence to abandon the congress in July of 1737 and gamble on its 
ability to defeat Russia and Austria.173 
The first phase of Russo-Turkish relations lasted from 1729 – 1732 and focused 
primarily on the balance among Persia, Turkey and Russia, especially in relation to 
Russia’s Persian territories.174  Rondeau repeatedly emphasized that Russia would not 
under any circumstances allow the Ottomans to control the Caspian for economic and 
strategic reasons: to allow the Russians to fend off the Tatars, Persians and Turks.  The 
possibility of conflict between Turkey and Persia presented the specter of Russia’s having 
to take a side in that conflict or fight against both sides if they united to attack Russian 
conquests.  Rondeau specifically reported worry that the Persians and Porte would unite 
to drive the Russians out of Ghilan so that the Ottomans could reclaim the silk trade.  
There was also conflict between Russia and Turkey over who could claim the allegiance 
of Tatar princes in territories that had been divided between the Porte and Persia – 
especially the Dagestan Tatars. 
During this period Russia continually feared, and intermittently prepared for, war 
with Turkey.  At times the Russians worried about a joint attack from the Porte and 
Sweden, spurred by the British and French (before the British allied with Vienna in 1731) 
or the French alone.  Diplomats either genuinely worried or liked to scaremonger, 
indicating that war with Turkey would make Russia unable to meet its treaty obligation to 
supply troops to Austria per the powers’ 1726 treaty.  Meanwhile, through court 
conversation, Rondeau discerned Turkish concern over Russian actions that violated the 
Treaty of Pruth: marching troops into Poland and building forts on Turkish frontiers.  In 
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1731 Russia began constructing a fortification line from the Don to the Orel to fend off 
the Budzi and Crimean Tatars, who served the Turks.   
1733 marked a new phase in the categorization of Ottoman relations, which were 
now seen in the context of the Polish Succession crisis.175  As Rondeau reported on the 
Ottoman-Persian war, he considered it a relief to Turkey’s “European Neighbors,” who 
were glad to see the Porte distracted.  Rondeau reported the concern that Stanislaus 
Lezhenski’s election would result in an alliance among Poland, Sweden, Turkey and 
France.  In October, news that the Porte had no plans to attack prompted Russian 
willingness to supply the emperor with the 45,000 troops promised in the Austro-Russian 
treaty (though they would not agree to deploy them until the following March).  In late 
December the Russian court received a letter from the Porte “expostulating” about Polish 
affairs, but news of continual Persian military success quelled their fears. 
1734-35 was marked by the ongoing threat of war and disastrous British 
intervention into Russo-Ottoman diplomacy.176  The need to ensure that Turkey did not 
overtake Persia (and thus the Caspian) remained the Russian impetus to war.  The 
Russian court felt sufficiently confident in Persia’s strength in early 1735 to give up 
control of its remaining Persian territories.  However, Turkey soon attacked Persia, 
placing Russia on a war footing once again. 
As 1734 began, Russia was reportedly in preparations to attack Turkey.  By mid-
March the prospect of an offensive war faded despite encouragement by the Persian 
ambassador. In July Britain and the States General undertook a mediating role in 
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Constantinople between the Porte and Russia in order to prevent open hostilities.  The 
Russian court seemed reasonably content with this arrangement until late November, 
when it became clear that the actions of British resident, Lord Kinnoul, did more to 
foment conflict at the Porte than prevent a rupture.  At the end of that month Osterman 
requested that George II recall Lord Kinnoul.177 
In 1735 tensions that had been simmering since at least 1729 brought the Ottoman 
Empire and Russia close to war.178  First, news in late January that the Ottomans did not 
plan to attack Russia, and thus it was no longer necessary to keep so many troops on 
Turkish borders, relieved the court.  In May Rondeau reported that Anna felt sufficiently 
reassured that the Persians had enough strength to prevent the Ottomans from taking over 
any of the remaining territory in Russian control, and therefore had agree to relinquish 
them.  In late June developments in Persia led to the most urgent talk yet of war between 
Turkey and Russia.  News from Constantinople revealed that the Turks would attack the 
Persians in the areas the Russian court believed secure, requesting that a Crimean Tatar 
khan send an army through Persian territory to join the Turks.  Though the Russians had 
received assurances from the Porte that the Tatar khan and his men would not cause harm 
to Russian subjects as they passed near their dominions, Osterman said directly to 
Rondeau that Anna would never allow the Turks to settle on the Caspian, and declared 
the same to the ambassadors from Poland and Vienna.  Rondeau opined that Anna would 
never have relinquished the remaining Persian territories to the Persians had she believed 
the Ottomans would attack.  The Russians dispatched soldiers to remain on watch in case 
                                                
177 For an account of Kinnoul’s time in Constantinople, see Nigel Webb and Caroline Webb, The Earl and 
His Butler in Constantinople : The Secret Diary of an English Servant among the Ottomans (London, GBR: 
I.B. Tauris, 2008). 
178 For correspondence related to Turkey in 1735, see Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva 
Volume 76. 
 60 
the Tatar khan began his march toward Dagestan.  The issue that the Turks raised in 
1729, regarding the Russians inappropriately courting the allegiance of the Dagestan 
Tatars, came up again as Osterman declared “ancient privileges” over them and 
complained that the Turks would attempt to control them if they were allowed to take 
over Dagestan.  Late in the year Russian troops evacuated Persia, leading Rondeau to 
believe that the Tatar khan would not pass through Dagestan that year.  He assumed, due 
to the number of troops they were amassing in the Ukraine, that the Russians would 
attack Turkey in the spring.  In August, the disruptive Lord Kinnoul was finally recalled 
by London. 
Throughout the first months of 1736, the Russians attempted to discover the 
Tatar’s khan’s movements.179  By late February the Tatar Khan had turned back toward 
the Crimea, Tachmas Kuli Khan had taken command of the Dagestan Tatars in Derbent, 
and Turkey engaged in massive war preparations.  The Russians indicated that they 
planned to attack in late March; after hostilities began there was still an opportunity to 
avoid full-blown war with Turkey.  However, all sides played a waiting game.  With 
Turkey and Persia still engaged Russia did not want to settle with the Turks for fear that 
Persia would also; Osterman was convinced that the Porte would attack immediately 
upon making peace with Persia.  Emperor Charles VI of Austria faced difficulty freeing 
up troops as the French and Spaniards slowly evacuated the Italian territories he had 
acquired in the just-completed War of the Polish Succession.  Vienna did not enter the 
war with Russia in 1736 and offended the court by attempting to mediate on behalf of 
Russia and the Turks rather than behave as Russia’s ally.  The Russians would have 
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preferred that the emperor admit he could not honor his commitment to supply troops 
rather than stall and act as an arbitrator; those who rationalized the defensive alliance 
with the emperor as necessary to securing a reliable ally against Turkey now had little 
basis for defending Vienna.  Britain’s tepid diplomatic efforts also irked the Russian 
court.  Before it would enter into peace negotiations, Russia insisted on receiving 
proposals from the Porte to redress all of the harm perpetrated along its borders.  Russia 
did not think Britain insisted on these terms forcefully enough.  Additionally, the court 
resented the efforts of the States General, Austria and Britain to generate proposals out of 
Vienna rather than through St. Petersburg.  Not until late August would Anna order 
Osterman to draft conditions for peace.  Subsequent to Munnich’s retreat from the 
Crimea in October, and internal tumult in Persia, Turkey sought to bring France and 
Sweden into negotiations to counterbalance the preponderance of nations it viewed as 
Russia’s allies.  After months of communication regarding Turkish and Russian 
requirements for a meeting on the frontiers, in December Britain approved a back-
channel plan suggested by Rondeau that would allow the Porte to save face by not 
submitting to Russia’s desire to propose peace conditions directly.  Meanwhile, the 
Persians had reportedly negotiated peace with the Turkey.  While Anna directed the 
Russian envoy at Vienna to collaborate on a plan for spring military operations, Biron 
complained that the emperor would not threaten to attack the Ottomans if they did not 
make peace with Russia that winter.  Russia ended the year dissatisfied with its allies. 
Much of 1737 revolved around conditions for meeting on the frontiers and the 
eventual Congress of Niemeroff, which met July through October.180  The congress failed 
                                                
180 For correspondence related to Turkey from 1737, see Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva 
Volume 80. 
 62 
when Vienna’s belated and unsuccessful military operations bolstered Turkish 
confidence.  Much of the correspondence for the rest of the year focused on efforts to 
reconvene a congress. 
 The 1738 correspondence revolved primarily around the struggle for control of 
mediation with the Porte.181  Vienna’s desire to place mediation with the Porte in the 
hands of France alone, without the input of the maritime powers, would leave Russia 
without intermediaries by the year’s end. While the emperor insisted on France’s 
participation in mediation, Russia agreed to it only on the condition that the Dutch and 
British would also mediate.  Vienna applied considerable pressure to no avail and 
eventually consented to the maritime powers’ inclusion.  In May it became clear that the 
Porte would not consent to assembling a second peace congress as it ignored the letters 
from the Dutch and British residents on the subject.  A victory at the Perecop in July did 
not diminish Russia’s strong desire for peace.  The Russian court hoped that additional 
Russian and imperial victories might make the Porte ready to negotiate.  In September 
Rondeau reported that a French courier from Constantinople communicated directly to 
Munnich that Turkey would settle if Anna returned Kinburn and Oczakof and razed 
Azov’s fortifications.  Additionally, the emperor would need to satisfy the Protestant 
Transylvanian rebel Rakotzy.  Meanwhile, in October irritation over the emperor’s paltry 
troop deployment in Hungary led Rondeau to surmise that the Russo-Austrian alliance 
might rupture.  While the emperor had encouraged the Porte to take advantage of Dutch 
and British efforts in Constantinople, the French envoy eventually excluded the British 
and Dutch residents entirely from negotiations with Vienna’s knowledge.  In November, 
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in order to preserve their dignity, both Britain and Holland removed negotiating powers 
from their envoys at Constantinople.  
In 1739 most of the diplomatic correspondence focused on renewing negotiations 
with the Porte through the British and Dutch residents in Constantinople.182  The Grand 
Vizier’s deposition in March provided a new opportunity for reconciliation and Russia 
secretly allowed the French sole control of the mediation.   
After Munnich’s successes in early September led the Russians to believe they 
could drive Turkey to retreat, on September 11 Rondeau reported that Anna had raised 
forty thousand recruits.  Then, on September 15 he indicated that an estafette had 
revealed that the emperor made a separate peace with the Porte.  Vienna sent news on the 
29th that Russia’s peace had been signed on the 18th.  On October 13, after Rondeau’s 
untimely death, his secretary Bell reported that Anna had given full negotiating powers to 
the French envoy at Constantinople, Villeneuve.  By the end of October the Treaty of 
Belgrade had been ratified. 
As we have seen, in the years leading up to the war, the threat of a rupture with 
the Ottomans remained almost constant and the British diplomats at the Russian court 
repeatedly reported on the Russians’ need to prevent the Ottoman Empire from gaining 
control of the Caspian.  Due to amicable relations with the Persians, the ability to trade in 
Persia duty free without the expense and difficulty of maintaining a garrison, and 
confidence that the Persians could fend off Turkey, in 1735 Russia ceded the few 
territories remaining of those Peter the Great’s soldiers had claimed in the 1720s.  The 
Porte then rapidly attacked Persia, alarming the Russian court.  Russia sought to prevent a 
Crimean Tatar Khan from crossing through Dagestan to Turkey’s aid; the ability to claim 
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the allegiance of the Dagestan Tatars emerged as a contentious issue in 1729 and 1736.  
According to the British correspondence, this march was the initial cause of hostilities in 
1735, and in 1736 the indication that Turkey planned to attack Russia if the Persians 
surrendered put Russia on the offensive.   
A survey of religious language as it related to the Russo-Turkish war reveals that 
it emerged from the British Northern Department rather than St. Petersburg.  In February 
of 1735 Lord Harrington made two references to the “Christian powers.”  First, he simply 
indicated that the resident in Constantinople assured the British court that “the Turks” 
would “not break out at least this year with any of the christian powers. . .”183  The 
following week, Harrington wrote regarding a Swedish envoy who had opposed the 
Russians in Poland and whose assignment to the Porte the Russians wanted to block.  
When describing the justification he would send to the resident in Stockholm to block the 
envoy, Harrington wrote that the resident should emphasize that his appointment would 
upset Anna, “since he was so active and zealous a person in the affairs of Poland while he 
continued in that kingdom, and may from the same principles fall in with those who are 
ready to animate the turks against the christian powers on that side, which His Majesty 
takes all the pains he can to prevent.184  Thus, Britain and Sweden were not united to 
defend the Protestant interest.  Rather, Britain sought to assist Russia in preventing the 
Swedish envoy from joining parties who sought to agitate the Porte against its Christian 
neighbors, Russia and Austria. 
Rondeau would occasionally send descriptions of populations unfamiliar to the 
British court whose protection was a matter of dispute between Turkey and Russia.  In 
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April of 1736 he wrote about the Saporog Cossacks since they might be unfamiliar to the 
“Christian world”:  “They profess the greek religion, and when they were under the 
protection of the turks, the patriarch of Constantinople furnished them with priests; but 
since these two years that they are under the protection of the Czarinna, their priests are 
sent them by the archbishop of Kioff. They have only one church, which is served by an 
abbot and a few priests...”185  In August of 1735 he wrote about Crimean khans: “twenty 
two sovereignties or khans are mahometans, and the Crim tartar khan pretends they are 
under his protection, which this court denies, and is a continual occasion of disputes 
between the russ and the turks.”186  Rondeau provided these descriptions for whatever 
usefulness of knowledge they would provide to the king, however, he does not frame 
them as causes of the current war.187 
In addition to explaining the situations of specific populations, Rondeau reported 
on religious/national communities encountered through the course of hostilities.  In June 
of 1736 when relaying news of Munnich’s taking the town of Kozolov, he indicated that 
the town was “a place of great trade, having a good harbour,” where there were, “a great 
many greeks and armeniens, and some jesuits; the latter are retired to Constantinople.”188  
In July of 1737 Field Marshal Lacy reported that a prince he had taken prisoner indicated 
that the Crimean khan had held an assembly at the Perecop in order to debate whether to 
submit to Anna, “since they found the Ottoman Porte was not at present in a condition to 
protect them against the russ. We shall soon hear, my lord, if the tartars take that 
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resolution; but as all those people are mahometans, few can yet persuade themselves, that 
they will submit to the russ till the last extremity.”189  While Rondeau does not portray 
the Christians as in any way grateful for the Russians’ suzerainty, Crimean Tatar 
Muslims are portrayed as unwilling to submit to an Orthodox sovereign.  Again, 
conversion and liberation are not revealed as motivations. 
Finally, Rondeau reported on religious court ceremony associated with victories 
over Turkey and the Tatars.  In June of 1736 when Russians took over Perecop, “the 
cannon of the citadel and admiralty were fired by the Czarinna's order two hours after the 
arrival of the courier, and Her Majesty went to the church in the citadel to return god 
thanks for the great advantages her arms have gained over the tartars.”190  When Azov 
surrendered in July of the same year, “the cannon of the cittadel and admiralty were fired, 
and Her Majesty went to the great church, where a Te Deum was sung.”191  In August of 
1737, “Her Czarish Majesty went to church with a great train to return thanks to God for 
the good success of her arms over the infidels. All the great guns of the citadel and 
admiralty were fired.”192  Although Rondeau chose the word “infidel,” we can assume 
that Russian court’s victories over Muslims held special significance.  Though Rondeau 
reported Anna’s visits to church in relation to a variety of other celebrations, no specific 
battle during the War of the Polish Succession merited a special church visit (or a report 
on one).  Thus, the religious dimension of the conflict was to some degree integrated into 
court culture. 
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Though the court identified against its Muslim adversary, overall Rondeau’s 
dispatches counterbalance other sources that amplify Munnich’s “Oriental Project.” We 
saw above that Bruess indicated that Munnich generated the vision based on experiences 
on the ground.  Rondeau’s reports support this notion of the generals’ encountering local 
Christian populations and the overall conflict between Turkey and Russia over the 
allegiance and protection of Orthodox communities.  Comparing these religious issues 
with the need to control the Caucasus and Caspian for strategic purposes, however, 
diminishes their importance as a causative explanation.  
If Russia could have claimed the Crimea, controlled the Black Sea, and reclaimed 
Constantinople, it would have gained glory and riches.  Protecting against Tatar 
incursions was clearly necessary, as the Crimean and Budzi Tatars had caused enough 
concern to prompt the construction of a fortification line in 1731.  Ensuring that the 
Ottomans could not disrupt the buffer zone maintained by the Persians and commandeer 
Caspian trade, however, were also compelling reasons to do battle against Ottoman allies 
on the Pontic Steppe and in the Crimea.  The Russians were still able to benefit from 
trade originating in Persia and abandonment of the Persian possessions relieved the 
military servitors who complained of the difficult climate, unreliable supply lines, and 
massive human toll.  Additionally, the expense of maintaining the Persian presence was 
prohibitive.  Thus, the Russians knew how difficult it would have been to assist the 
Persians in their dominions relative to the battlefields the Russians chose.  Further, 
whereas the issue of the Persian buffer zone remained constant, Rondeau did not mention 
Russia’s desire to overtake the Crimea until 1735.  While religion clearly informed the 
court’s perception of its victories, and may have contributed to personal motivations, the 
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correspondence does not reveal them as long-standing motivations for war.  Clearly, we 
should consider the British diplomatic correspondence, and what it reveals about the 
Russo-Persian-Ottoman balance, when considering Russia’s motivations for going to war 
against Turkey in 1736. 
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Conclusion	  
 
 We have seen that generally in Europe, and specifically in Russia, confessional 
strife remained divisive into the 1730s.  Additionally, both the cultural “Westernization” 
that occurred under Peter, and the “Germanization” under Anna Ivanovna exhibited 
Lutheran features.  Peter’s top theologian and propagandist, Feofan Prokopovitch, whose 
Lutheran leanings attracted so much criticism, was restored to prominence in Anna’s 
reign after persecution under Peter II.  Further, Anna’s court culture reinforced 
acceptance of Lutheranism while actively ridiculing Catholicism.  The integration of 
elites from Baltic regions annexed during the Great Northern War, who kept their own 
church and legal/cultural institutions, largely explains the acceptance of Lutheranism.  
The elite cultural “westernization” that occurred during this time can be considered 
confessionalized westernization.  Finally, in discussing “Germans” in Russia, scholars 
should make an effort to distinguish among foreign servitors and elites from integrated 
lands, as referring to them generally as “German” elides important differences. 
 While religious conflict held the potential to incite Catholics, Protestants and the 
Orthodox throughout Europe, statespersons did not make decisions about war and peace 
based on religious factors.  Though religion was used to inflame passions, especially 
through the publication of pamphlets, and seems to have been extraordinarily important 
to people of all confessions, it did not unite heads of state.  Protecting Orthodox and 
Protestant dissidents in Poland did not motivate Russia’s or Britain’s actions in the War 
of the Polish Succession.  Further, while Anna may have held special church services to 
celebrate victories over the “infidel” “Turks,” the diplomatic correspondence does not 
reflect any efforts to unite Christian powers in a crusade.  Similar to the language about 
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the “Protestant Interest,” references to “Christian Powers” come across as obligatory 
turns of phrase.  Further, that Munnich developed his “Oriental Project” after securing 
victories and encountering Christians who sought Russia’s protection, supports the notion 
that territorial, strategic and economic concerns outweighed any fantasy about reclaiming 
Constantinople. 
 In the case of Russia’s war against Turkey from 1736-39, the need to keep a 
Persian buffer zone on the Caspian to maintain trade was an important motivation for 
exterminating Crimean Tatars.  Eliminating populations sympathetic to the Ottoman 
Empire who could come to its aid in the Caucasus seems very likely to have increased the 
security of the Persian buffer zone, in addition to reducing incursions into Russian 
territory.  Though the Russians may have preferred more advantageous Black Sea and 
Crimean gains, we can consider the maintenance of Caspian interests an important goal. 
 Finally, we saw that the “backward” “Old Rus” nobility did not prevent Russia 
from entering into a formal commercial agreement with Britain before 1734.  British and 
Russian factional divisions and geostrategic considerations made it impossible for formal 
relations to resume until Jacobite hopes for a British invasion were quelled, the 
Schleswig/Holstein issue was resolved, and Britain reconciled with Russia’s primary ally, 
Austria.  That Russia did not gain its much sought-after defensive alliance as part of the 
commercial treaty was not a diplomatic failure, a manifestation of one “German” 
statesman’s strategy winning out over another’s, or Russia’s dependence on Britain.  
Rather, in exchange for the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734, 
Britain and the States General negotiated the evacuation of the pretender to the throne 
during the War of the Polish Succession, allowing Russia to remove its troops from 
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Poland and deploy them to assist the emperor.  Britain’s alliance with Austria made it 
useful to the Russians during that period, whereas later in the reign it was Britain who 
desperately sought a defensive alliance with Russia and was repeatedly rebuffed. 
 While remaining narrow in its temporal focus, this work has challenged 
historiographic perspectives that obfuscate key aspects of Anna Ivanovna’s reign.  Future 
work will integrate examinations of seventeenth-century cultural and confessional 
westernization and elite integration, continuity and change in the religious rhetoric 
justifying anti-Turkish alliances among European powers, trade and imperial expansion, 
and discussion of the ways in which reimagining Anna’s reign shifts our perceptions of 
eighteenth-century Russian foreign policy and diplomatic relations. 
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